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Abstract

PATIENT OUTCOMES AND MANAGED CARE: WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE
STATE REGULATORY BACKLASH?
By Tina C. Highfill, M.A.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017.
Major Director: Dolores G. Clement, Dr. P.H., Department of Health Administration
Hundreds of state regulations were passed during the “managed care backlash”
of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of these anti-managed care regulations eased
or eliminated constraints on patient utilization of health care services imposed by
managed care organizations. Other regulations gave managed care providers more
flexibility in the way they practiced care or helped patients appeal denials of claims.
Despite the effort undertaken to pass these regulations, limited research exists on
whether the regulations achieved their goal. To fill this gap, this study takes advantage
of the variety of regulations enacted during the managed care backlash of the late
1990s and early 2000s to investigate their impact on patient-reported quality of care and
mortality for managed care enrollees.
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally-representative
survey of health care expenditures and experiences, provided information for the three
patient-reported outcomes in this analysis: access to care, confidence in provider, and
patient satisfaction with care. Mortality was determined by linking the MEPS data to the

National Death Index. Data for 1996, 2000, and 2004 were examined. A difference-indifference-in-difference approach was used to investigate the change in outcomes for
managed care patients in states with moderate- and high-intensity backlash regulations
relative to managed care patients in states with low-intensity regulations.
The results indicate the regulations did improve patient-reported outcomes, but to
varying degrees and only in the latter period of the backlash. Specifically, managed care
enrollees who lived in states that adopted moderate-intensity regulations between 2000
and 2004 reported relatively better improvements in access to care and confidence in
their provider than did managed care enrollees in states with low-intensity backlash
regulations. The positive effect on access to care was similar in states that adopted
high-intensity regulations. However, no positive effect was found for any outcome in the
first period (1996-2000). These results show that states with the most intense regulatory
backlash did not realize better patient-reported outcomes. Instead, states that pursued
moderate-intensity backlash regulations experienced relatively better outcomes for their
managed care enrollees.

Chapter I: Introduction

Study Problems
This study examines the impact of the managed care regulatory backlash on
patient outcomes for managed care enrollees. In the late 1990s, almost one-third of
Americans with private health insurance were enrolled in managed care plans (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2002). During that time, managed care organizations (MCOs)
pursued cost savings by negotiating payment directly with providers and by enforcing
strict utilization rules (Rodwin, 1997). Negative public sentiment arose from the
widespread belief that access to services and quality of care was suffering due to the
cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). A “backlash” against managed care
began in 1990s, leading to hundreds of state regulations in all fifty states mandating
changes for these companies (Pinkovskiy, 2014). While clinical quality was found to be
generally equivalent between people with managed care and traditional fee-for-service
(FFS) insurance, managed care patients often had worse patient-reported outcomes
(PROs) (Miller & Luft, 2002). In particular, managed care enrollees in the 1990s
reported relatively lower satisfaction with care and worse access to care (Miller & Luft,
1997; Phillips, Mayer, & Aday, 2000).
A principal goal of the managed care backlash regulations was to ensure
patients’ access to essential health care services and improve quality of care (Zelman,
1999). Despite the passage of hundreds of state laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s
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to do so, limited research exists on whether the regulations had those intended
outcomes. To fill this gap, this study investigates the impact of managed care laws on
access to care, confidence in provider, patient satisfaction with care, and mortality.
Study Scope
This study takes advantage of the variety of regulations enacted during the
managed care backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate their impact on
quality of care for managed care enrollees. Patient-reported access to care is the first
PRO examined since the bulk of the regulations specifically sought to enhance this
aspect of quality. The second PRO included in this study is patient confidence in their
provider. During the backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s, many managed care
patients believed treatment decisions were being driven by cost concerns and not the
quality of their care (Baker & McClellan, 2001). This belief was thought to undermine
confidence or trust in the patient-provider relationship and lead to dissatisfaction with
care. The third PRO in this study is patient satisfaction with care, which was found to be
consistently lower for managed care patients relative to FFS patients before the
backlash (Miller & Luft, 2002). The fourth outcome studied is overall mortality. Past
research is mixed on whether mortality for managed care patients significantly differed
from those with FFS insurance (Miller & Luft, 2002). A 2014 analysis on the impact of
the managed care backlash on health care spending and mortality suggests the
regulations did not significantly affect mortality (Pinkovskiy, 2014). However, only statelevel mortality data were used and the results are described as measuring the impact of
increased managed care prevalence and not necessarily the regulatory backlash. This
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analysis will help clarify Pinkovskiy’s results on mortality using more sophisticated data
and methods.
This study investigates whether the managed care regulatory backlash affected
two domains of care quality: patient-reported outcomes and mortality. Specifically, in
states that adopt relatively intense managed care backlash regulations, do managed
care enrollees experience:
1. Improved access to care?
2. More satisfaction with their care?
3. More confidence in their providers?
4. Lower overall mortality?
Background
Managed care.
Most working Americans had fee-for-service (FFS) health insurance plans
obtained through their employer in the second half of the twentieth century (Shi & Singh,
2014). In traditional employer-sponsored FFS insurance plans, insurance companies
were paid premiums by employers to cover the cost of health care services for their
employees. Large firms could also self-insure and pay for medical bills directly. With
FFS insurance, employees obtained services from their choice of provider, the provider
submitted a claim (i.e., bill) to the insurance company or employer, and the provider was
reimbursed. Patients usually paid a small deductible or co-payment for services.
Providers reimbursed using FFS insurance relied on the volume of care they delivered
to sustain their income. Providers had an inherent incentive to supply more care than
necessary to increase their income, such as by ordering unnecessary tests (Glied &
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Zivin, 2002). Beginning in the 1980s, many providers also began utilizing new and
expensive technologies to treat their FFS patients (Bodenheimer, 2005). Soon after,
health care expenditures grew rapidly due partly to provider-induced demand and often
unjustifiable utilization of costly technologies (Emanuel & Fuchs, 2008). The high cost of
unrestrained utilization eventually led insurance companies to raise annual privatesector employer health insurance premiums in the late 1990s by double-digits annually
(Titlow & Emanuel, 1999). Though managed care was formally promoted in the 1970s
as a cost-effective alternative to FFS health insurance through the passage of the HMO
Act of 1974 (Noble & Brennan, 1999), managed care plans were relatively rare
compared to traditional FFS insurance until the mid-1990s when more than one-third of
people with private health insurance belonged to an HMO (Zuvekas & Hill, 2004). By
then, annual employer premiums for health care had grown drastically and some
employers turned to managed care to cut costs. As of 1996, only 27% of eligible
employees participated in traditional employer-sponsored FFS insurance plans (Shi &
Singh, 2014).
Definitions for managed care differ, but the general concept is an integration of
the four major aspects of the health care system: financing, insurance, delivery, and
payment (Shi & Singh, 2014). In the strictest form of managed care, health care
providers are salaried employees of a managed care organization (MCO). In this MCO
“staff” model of care, the salaries eliminate the incentive for provider-induced demand
because provider compensation is not related to the volume of care delivered. Instead,
these providers follow care guidelines established by the MCO that often relied on
utilization restrictions to keep costs low (Kemper, Tu, Reschovsky, & Schaefer, 2002).

4

Providers can also contract with an MCO directly or as part of an independent provider
association (IPA). These providers are reimbursed either through capitation or
discounted fees. With capitation, a provider receives a fixed monthly payment from the
MCO for each enrollee that designates the provider as his/her PCP. Capitation helps
MCOs control its share of the costs by shifting financial risk to providers by making them
responsible for the total cost of each member’s care in exchange for a fixed monthly
payment. The advantage to providers for contracting with the MCO is the guaranteed
income from supply of enrollees, since PCPs are paid the same capitation payment
regardless of whether the enrollee receives care. With capitation, providers also have
an incentive to keep costs low to cover unexpectedly high-cost patients and because
any money left over annually is paid out to the providers (Zuvekas & Hill, 2004).
In practice, over half of providers who contracted with MCOs in the late 1990s
and early 2000s were reimbursed using a discounted fee schedule agreement (Zuvekas
& Cohen, 2010). This means for each service or procedure provided to patients,
providers were paid a previously-negotiated amount from the MCO, similar to FFS
insurance. However, with managed care, not all health care services were covered,
some services required preauthorization by the MCO, and enrollees were required to
see only providers in the MCO network. These MCO policies served to keep costs down
for MCOs and restrict utilization without the explicit control found in the MCO staff
model. Most managed care plans also required that a single provider be responsible for
coordinating an enrollee’s care, called a primary care physician (PCP) or gatekeeper.
Research has shown that patients with chronic conditions whose care is coordinated
through a gatekeeper often have better clinical outcomes and lower costs (Smith, 2003).
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Many programs used today to curb spending on high-cost patients utilize gatekeeping,
such as patient-centered medical homes, acknowledging the method’s effectiveness for
controlling costs and potentially increasing quality (Cromwell, Trisolini, Pope, Mitchell, &
Greenwald, 2011).
The four major aspects of health care (financing, insurance, delivery, and
payment) were largely separated for people with FFS insurance in the late 1990s, unlike
with managed care. There was no formal mechanism like gatekeeping to coordinate
care for patients who required intensive health care services since patients chose where
and when to receive care themselves. Disjointed care often resulted in unnecessarily
high costs and poor quality of care in these cases (Baldwin, 2001). Additionally, MCO
enrollees often paid nothing or very little for preventative care services received from
their PCP, unlike people with FFS insurance. Emphasis was given to preventative care
because it has shown to prevent more expensive services in the long run, such as highcost inpatient hospital stays (Zhan, Miller, Wong, & Meyer, 2004). Past research has
found MCO enrollees are often satisfied with the cost of their care, more so than people
with FFS insurance (Pifer et al., 2003).
Managed care backlash.
The cost-driven aspect of managed care is believed to have undermined patient
confidence in providers, eventually leading to a backlash against managed care
beginning in the mid-1990s (Baker & McClellan, 2001). In particular, patients worried
about the effect of restricting utilization on quality of care. Managed care organizations
required providers to undergo extensive utilization reviews and negotiated with them
directly on prices and coverage to reduce costs (Rodwin, 1997). Providers in MCO
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networks were sometimes offered incentives for restricting utilization, such as year-end
bonuses for keeping costs below a pre-determined amount (Grumbach, Osmond,
Vranizan, Jaffe, & Bindman, 1998). Although anecdotal evidence showed some patients
were negatively impacted from not receiving necessary care, a review found MCO
enrollees on average did not receive lower quality of care and preventative care was
often better (Miller & Luft, 2002; Zuvekas & Hill, 2004). Nonetheless, the perception that
managed care was inferior to FFS insurance pervaded public and media sentiment
(Noble & Brennan, 1997).
Two major factors appeared to perpetuate the extent of the managed care
backlash. First, providers became openly hostile to the utilization restrictions imposed
by MCOs, convincing patients that their decision-making process was being interfered
with (Shi & Singh, 2014). Second, the shift to managed care was driven almost entirely
by employers responding to increases in health insurance premiums. Since employees
were mostly shielded from the cost of insurance in the past, the savings for employers
from reduced premiums went mostly unnoticed by employees (Blendon, Brodie,
Benson, & Altman, 1998). Instead, employees perceived their health care plan choices
were being scaled back with no accompanying reduction in their share of the costs. The
issue of limited choice of plans was especially relevant for employees in firms that only
offered a single health insurance option or in areas with few managed care providers.
While some studies demonstrated negative outcomes for managed care patients
relative to FFS patients regarding access to specialty services (Van Voorhees, Wang, &
Ford, 2003) and satisfaction with care (Miller & Luft, 1997), other studies showed a lack
of public understanding about MCOs drove much of the backlash (Bernard & Shulkin,

7

1998; Wilensky, 1999). One study found that people with FFS insurance were much
more likely to rate MCOs as low-quality compared to ratings from actual MCO patients
(Kahana et al., 2004). In the same survey, respondents were asked to name
advantages of having managed care—MCO enrollees overwhelmingly chose lower
costs, while those with FFS were not able to think of a single advantage. The strong
negative perception of managed care was therefore not always a matter of personal
experience.
Emphasizing preventative care and gatekeeping were relatively new concepts to
many people in the early 1990s. The FFS system was never intended to provide
comprehensive health care services and care management that MCOs offer, instead it
was designed for the treatment of illness and injury. Despite the enhanced access to
preventative services from MCOs, the idea of restricting patient and provider choices
was often considered unacceptable to people with traditional insurance (White, 1999).
Pervasive negative media attention highlighted denial of care horror stories for certain
managed care enrollees, further fueling the perception that managed care was
synonymous with poor-quality care (Bernard & Shulkin, 1998).
In general, the managed care backlash is linked to the perception that strict
utilization rules were motivated entirely by cost containment goals, without considering
the quality of care being delivered (Baker & McClellan, 2001). As such, many states
began passing regulations that directly sought to weaken these rules for MCOs and
ensure access to services for their enrollees (Zelman, 1999). Although health care has
long been a heavily-regulated sector, the anti-managed care regulations were distinctive
in their scope and magnitude. All states passed at least one law characterized as a
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“managed care backlash” law by the National Council of State Legislators (NCSL), and
many states passed dozens of these laws (Blendon et al., 1998). In general, the
regulations sought to ensure MCOs treat their enrollees more similar to that of FFS
patients. The content of each state’s managed care backlash regulations is unique,
though the laws are often grouped into three categories: access to services, right to
appeals, and provider flexibility (Pinkovskiy, 2014; NCSL, 2011). A number of laws
specifically curtailed the PCP gatekeeper requirement. States also passed laws allowing
women with managed care to have direct access to OB/GYNs and requiring that MCOs
cover care provided in the Emergency Department. Regulations relating to appeals
addressed liability issues, such as allowing patients to sue health plans for damages
and requiring external reviews of appeals (Hurley & Draper, 2002). Finally, provider
flexibility regulations dealt with constraints on treatment options imposed by MCOs.
These laws included banning provider financial incentives to reduce utilization and
banning provider “gag” clauses that prohibited providers from informing patients of
alternative high-cost treatment options that the MCO did not want to reimburse.
Patient-reported outcomes.
The regulatory backlash against managed care coincided with a growing
movement toward more patient-centered health care (Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Whether patients are receiving patient-centered care, which focuses on providing care
to patients in a respectful and responsive manner, requires collection of patient-reported
outcomes (PROs). Patient-reported outcomes describe non-clinical outcomes reported
directly by patients, such as satisfaction with care, which provide a more comprehensive
picture of the patient experience and quality of care than is available using solely clinical
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information (Cella et al., 2010). Patient perceptions of health care quality are important
for providers because PROs are often correlated with other favorable health outcomes.
Patients who are satisfied with their care are more likely to stay with their primary care
providers and to adhere to treatments (Safran, Montgomery, Chang, Murphy, & Rogers,
2001; Zolnierek & Dimatteo, 2009). A study on heart attack patients showed that people
who reported higher satisfaction with their care not only adhered to guidelines more
frequently, but also had lower rates of inpatient mortality (Glickman et al., 2010).
Additionally, patients who have confidence in their primary care providers are more
likely to have better medication management and to engage in behaviors associated
with other favorable clinical outcomes (Street, Makoul, Arora, & Epstein, 2009).
Patient-reported outcomes are not universally embraced as legitimate measures
of health care quality (Kane, 2006). The link between clinical outcomes, such as
mortality and morbidity, and PROs varies. Although research suggests positive clinical
outcomes are linked to PROs such as satisfaction with care (Gotay, Kawamoto,
Bottomley, & Efficace, 2008; Glickman et al., 2010), other studies have found no
significant relationship between the two outcome types (Sequist et al., 2008; Chang et
al., 2006). One study suggested patient satisfaction is linked to providers meeting
patient expectations, even if that means a patient receives services with no medical
benefit (Fenton, Jerant, Bertakis, & Franks, 2012).
Study Objectives
To understand if regulation is an effective strategy, policymakers must know
whether past regulation achieved their goals. Hundreds of regulations were passed in
the late 1990s and early 2000s to ensure access to care and quality for managed care

10

enrollees, but limited research exists on whether the regulations led to those intended
outcomes. The scant research available often focuses on a single regulation, thereby
explaining only part of the managed care backlash effect. This analysis studies all
categories of backlash regulations to obtain a more complete understanding of the
backlash and their impact on patient outcomes. States are categorized by backlash
regulation intensity (number of regulations, plus stringency and rarity of regulations) to
understand how variations in the types of regulations impacted patient outcomes.
Therefore, the objective of this analysis is to determine whether states with a more
intense regulatory backlash realized more gains in patient outcomes for its managed
care enrollees relative to states with less intense backlash regulations.
Analytical approach.
The concepts for this study are organized using Donabedian’s (1988) structure,
process, outcomes (SPO) framework, which serves as a common foundation for health
care quality research (Kane, 2006). The SPO framework provides a succinct outline for
describing how managed care and the managed care regulations can impact patient
outcomes and is well-suited for examining the research questions of this study. The
structure dimension represents the fixed aspects of health care delivery, including
environmental, organizational, and patient factors. Environmental factors are considered
structural characteristics in this framework. While environmental factors are not explicitly
included in the original SPO model, research often rectifies this weakness by including
them as part of “Structure,” reflecting their potential to influence health care processes
and outcomes, and their relatively fixed nature (Unruh & Wan, 2004). Environmental
factors, such as where a patient lives and what problems a patient faces when
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accessing health care services, have been associated with differing costs and quality of
care (Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008; Ly, Lopez, Isaac, & Jha, 2010).
Regulatory environment, including managed care backlash regulations, is another
environmental factor included in the Structure dimension.
The process dimension in the SPO framework encompasses the activities of
health care professionals when delivering care to patients, including diagnosing, making
recommendations, and implementing treatment (Donabedian, 1988). Managed care
uses a process called gatekeeping to influence how care is coordinated. Coordination of
care for managed care enrollees entails having a single point of contact (PCP) to
diagnose and treat all medical problems, and to refer patients for specialty services
when needed. Gatekeeping can also influence the treatments patients receive.
Managed care patients may receive relatively fewer services than FFS patients because
MCOs limit the number and type of services they reimburse (Davidoff, Hill, Courtot, &
Adams, 2007). Therefore, due to gatekeeping, managed care patients experience
different care processes than FFS patients when they interact with health care
professionals.
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) provides information for the
three PROs in this analysis, patient satisfaction with care, confidence in provider, and
access to care. The MEPS is a representative two-year overlapping panel survey of
health care utilization and cost for non-institutionalized persons in the U.S., with an
annual sample size of around 30,000 people. It also includes information on insurance
status (including managed care enrollment) and demographics, including age, gender,
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and income. Mortality can be determined by linking the MEPS data to the National
Death Index.
A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach is used to address each
research question. Using a DDD model, differences in patient outcomes between
managed care and FFS patients are compared over time as states enacted their
managed care regulations. Specifically, this study investigates the difference in
outcomes for managed care patients in states with an intense regulatory backlash
relative to managed care patients in states with a moderate or mild backlash. This
model controls for changes in quality that potentially affected both types of patients over
the period, such as the adoption of electronic health records. The reference year in this
study is 1996. Most of the managed care regulations were passed between 1996-2000
and were usually implemented within a few months of being passed. Years 2000 and
2004 are considered as “post” periods. Studying quadrennial independent crosssections allows an analysis the regulatory effects bearing in mind the different timing of
regulation adoption.
It is unclear whether the state managed care backlash regulations passed in the
1990s actually improved patient outcomes. However, there is some evidence that the
managed care backlash regulations were responsible for much of the increase in health
care spending growth in the early 2000s (Pinkovskiy, 2014). This study contributes to
our understanding of governmental policy to manage health care by answering what
impact the regulatory backlash had on quality of care for managed care enrollees.
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Conclusion.
During the 1980s and 1990s, MCOs pursued cost savings by implementing strict
utilization rules and limiting provider networks (Rodwin, 1997). A backlash against
managed care arose from the perception that quality of care was suffering due to the
cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). As part of this backlash, states
passed laws regulating MCOs, eventually leading to hundreds of regulations by the mid2000s mandating changes for these companies (Pinkovskiy, 2014). The central goal of
the backlash regulations was to ensure patients received good quality of care (Zelman,
1999). To investigate whether this goal was achieved, this study takes advantage of the
differing levels of regulatory intensity to investigate the impact of these laws on quality
of care for managed care enrollees. The next chapter presents a literature review of
past research relevant to quality of care for managed care enrollees and to the
managed care backlash and regulations. Following the literature review, the conceptual
framework used to guide this analysis is presented. The methodology is then discussed,
followed by a presentation of the empirical analysis results. The final chapter discusses
the major lessons learned and ends with a brief discussion of future research.
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Chapter II: Literature Review

Quality of care for managed care enrollees has been a topic of interest since
managed care was promoted as a cost-effective alternative to traditional health
insurance in the 1970s (Miller & Luft, 1994). However, managed care enrollment was
relatively low compared to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) insurance until the mid1990s. By that point, double-digit increases in employer health care insurance premium
rates led many private employers to turn to managed care to save money (Enthoven,
Schauffler, & McMenamin, 2001). Since cost savings were often sought by restricting
utilization, providers and patients worried about the effect of managed care on quality of
care and patient outcomes. Research on health care quality for managed care enrollees
through the 1990s found that clinical quality was essentially equivalent between people
with managed care and FFS, though managed care patients often described relatively
worse patient-reported outcomes (Miller & Luft, 2002). In particular, managed care
enrollees reported relatively lower satisfaction and more problems accessing health
care services (Miller & Luft, 1997; Phillips, Mayer, & Aday, 2000). This study extends
past research by analyzing patient outcomes for FFS and managed care enrollees in
the context of the volatile regulatory environment of the late 1990s and early 2000s,
referred to as the “managed care backlash” era. Therefore, this literature review begins
with a synthesis of research on the managed care backlash and state regulations. This
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provides insight into the motivation behind the backlash and provides a framework for
understanding the other area of this review, quality of care for managed care enrollees.
This chapter begins with a description of the literature review search, followed by
a synthesis of the research and an integration of the literature. The final section explains
how the concepts learned from this review will help inform the theoretical and empirical
models of this study, presented in the subsequent two chapters.
Literature Review Search
This review was conducted using concepts from the systematic literature review
process. Petticrew and Roberts (2008) describe systematic reviews as, “[L]iterature
reviews that adhere closely to a set of scientific methods that explicitly aim to limit
systematic error (bias), mainly by attempting to identify, appraise and synthesize all
relevant studies (of whatever design)” (p.9). This approach helps to provide a
comprehensive and complete search of past literature, and better informs the theoretical
framework of this study. PubMED/MEDLINE and Web of Science (excluding MEDLINE)
search engines were used to investigate the two themes: the managed care backlash
and quality of care. The search for Theme 1 contained the keywords: “managed care” or
“health maintenance organization” and regulation or backlash. For Theme 2, “managed
care” or “health maintenance organization” and quality and access or confidence or
satisfaction or mortality or “health status.” Including the outcome variables narrowed the
results to papers relevant to the scope of this study. Keywords were searched across
titles and abstracts in PubMED and across topics in Web of Science. All articles and
books published in English, with human subjects, and with the U.S. as the setting were
included in the search. Theme 2 (quality of managed care) was restricted to July 2001-
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forward, owing to Miller and Luft’s (2004) earlier literature review covering the same
topic. No year restriction was given to the Theme 1 (managed care backlash and
regulations).
Search results.
Though many of the studies were published after the main backlash era (2004+),
the data used in the papers were often from the 1990s and early 2000s. The empirical
analyses range from case studies of patients transitioning to managed care from FFS
over time (usually Medicaid), to more straightforward comparisons of outcomes for
managed care (MCO) versus FFS patients. Cross-sectional analyses and papers with
only MCO enrollees were excluded. The exclusion criteria for Theme 1 was not as
stringent, since the goal was to provide context and background for the backlash. A
handful of additional papers were added from citations from the chosen articles. In the
end, 105 articles were included in the literature review, split almost evenly between the
two themes. Surprisingly few papers overlapped across both themes, highlighting the
need for research that integrates these areas.
A number of unique trends emerged from the selected papers. Research for
Theme 1 is grouped into four broad subthemes: understanding the backlash, provider
sentiment towards managed care, consumerism in health care, and redefining managed
care. Research for Theme 2, which is comprised solely of empirical analyses, is
grouped into three subthemes. The first subtheme specifically explores research on
health care quality for managed care enrollees, following in the footsteps of Miller and
Luft. The second subtheme examines the value and validity of using patient-reported
outcomes in health care quality research. Although this area of research was not
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specifically targeted for investigation, the amount of research on the topic and its
relevance to this study warranted its own subtheme. The last collection of papers
describe empirical research related to quality of managed care that did not fit into the
first two themes, including papers related to cost of care and rationing of care.
Synthesis of Previous Work
Theme 1. Managed care backlash and regulations.
Theme 1 provides a general overview of the managed care backlash and
regulations. Fifty-two papers are discussed, about half of which are devoted to the first
subtheme, understanding the motivation and nature of the backlash. The second
subtheme describes provider opinion of managed care, most of which turned out to be
negative. Next, the role of health care consumerism in perpetuating the backlash is
discussed. The final subtheme summarizes the evolution of managed care since the
backlash and regulations were passed.
Theme 1a. Understanding the managed care backlash.
While health insurance has been regulated since the mid-20th century, state
regulations became pervasive beginning in the 1970s (Gray, Lowery, & Godwin, 2007).
Many states began passing mandated benefit laws in the 1980s that required insurance
companies to cover specific people or services, laws that applied to all private insurance
companies (Laugesen, et al., 2006). By the 1990s, two mandates were eventually
adopted in all states: mandatory minimums for maternity stays and a requirement for
breast reconstruction surgery after a mastectomy (also federally mandated). These
mandated benefits laws paved the way for laws regulating managed care. Specifically,
in the 1990s, states began passing laws particular to MCOs. While many of these laws
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are essentially mandated benefit laws, others included allowing patients to sue
insurance companies and many broad “patient protection” laws. In general, the laws
were labeled backlash or anti-managed care regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014; NCSL,
2011). Papers written after the backlash often characterize the end of the backlash as
2003-2004, once states finished passing backlash regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014; Sloan,
Rattliff, & Hall, 2005).
The backlash regulations were characterized by economists as a response to
market failures (Sloan & Hall, 2002). This argument suggests laws are necessary to
protect enrollees from predatory insurance companies that do not provide adequate
coverage. In this way, legislation was seen by some as necessary. Bolin, Buchanan,
and Smith (2003) described the laws as a response, in part, to preserving the patientprovider relationship and enhancing access to care. Hurley and Draper (2002)
suggested legislation proved useful for encouraging insurer accountability for consumer
choice and access. Swartz and Brennan (1996), writing at the beginning of the
backlash, described how financial arrangements between MCOs and providers
incentivizes poor quality of care. They suggested government oversight and regulations
as the ways to correct the tradeoff between cost and quality.
Bernard and Shulkin (1998) found that negative media stories influenced public
sentiment of MCOs, even though most of the people surveyed never had a negative
experience with an MCO personally. Furthermore, Brodie, Brady, and Altman (1998)
determined the media portrayal of MCOs by 1997 was mostly negative and anecdotal,
contrasting with a generally neutral and factual tone of the media portrayal in the early
1990s. Similarly, Hall (2004) found states with more stringent backlash laws were more
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likely to experience copious amounts of negative media attention about MCOs.
However, those same health plan administrators insisted the laws were primarily
passed to ensure patients’ rights and to address provider interests. Mechanic (2001)
suggested public anger at managed care was misplaced due to the disproportionately
negative media attention, which prevented a discussion about better ways to deliver
care. Rabinowitz (2010) found newspaper support for managed care laws was swayed
by advertising campaigns. In general, many of the papers included in this subtheme
referenced some external voice as a major source of the backlash.
Teixeira (2000) argued the backlash reflected the sentiment of the public, who
were described as being satisfied with their care, but worried about what the future held
if MCOs and cost-cutting proliferated. Noble and Brennan (1999) list consumer
dissatisfaction with care as a key reason for backlash legislation. Many people resented
the idea of MCOs restricting their choice of doctor or the types of services they
received, even if quality of care was essentially equivalent for MCO and FFS enrollees
(Kahana et al., 2004). Interference by MCOs into treatment decisions was sometimes
seen as an impediment to patient confidence and trust in providers (Baker & McClellan,
2001). However, Gawande et al. (1998) found that people without a choice of health
plan had the same level of satisfaction with care as people with managed care plans,
suggesting the dissatisfaction with MCOs was more about the perception of restricted
choice than managed care itself. Kemper et al. (2002) found that more restrictive MCOs
had relatively lower scores on patient satisfaction and trust in provider than people with
FFS. Blendon et al. (1998) specified two reasons for the backlash: a significant
proportion of Americans reported having issues with MCOs, and people were scared
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MCOs would not take care of them if they got sick. One article suggested the backlash
was partially caused by consumer ignorance of the true cost of health care (Thompson
& Cutler, 2010).
Many articles suggested the regulations could result in unintended negative
consequences. Balla (1999) argued the regulations would prevent HMO development
and thereby raise overall costs. Mays, Hurley, and Grossman (2003) predicted
employer costs would increase once the MCO utilization constraints were lifted and
provider networks were opened. Relaxing MCO restrictions on prescription drug
utilization was also predicted to increase share of health care expenditures attributable
to drugs (Bolin et al., 2002). Brown and Hartung (1998) predicted the regulation of
health insurance would eventually lead to most plans looking like PPOs. Hurley and
Draper (2002) suggested additional laws would increase health care costs directly
(MCOs need to hire more lawyers, pay for more things, pass those costs to consumers),
driving up costs by preventing the cost-saving mechanisms of MCOs. As explained in
the last subtheme of Theme 1, many of the predictions proved to be accurate.
Theme 1b. Provider sentiment towards managed care.
This subtheme reviews papers related specifically to provider sentiments towards
managed care. These studies usually described how provider behaviors or practices
changed as a result of MCO practices, and if providers thought managed care
negatively impacted patient outcomes. Beach, Meredith, Halpern, Wells, and Ford
(2005) found in a survey of almost 900 physicians that providers in more restrictive
MCO models felt less responsibility for their patients compared to physicians in less
restrictive MCO arrangements. Ettner et al. (2006) found outcomes for diabetes patients
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were better when physicians were paid a salary instead of FFS or capitation, though
positive outcomes were dependent on how each organization was structured. Van
Voorhees et al. (2003) found physicians with the largest percentage of MCO patients
were more likely to report issues that prevented them from providing high-quality care.
Provider attitudes about managed care evolved since the 1970s, especially
relating to provider satisfaction. Using an early survey, Lum (1975) found physician
attitudes about HMOs were favorable on the whole, specifically surrounding prepayment
and quality of care. By the late 1990s, MacDermid et al. (2002) found provider concern
over reimbursement led to decreased provider satisfaction. However, another paper
found MCOs did not impact the relationship between provider satisfaction and patientreported quality (Grembowski, Patrick, Williams, Diehr, & Martin, 2005). The authors
found many physicians did not believe MCOs impacted how they delivered care. Those
same providers reported negative feelings toward the degree of regulation. Likewise,
Landon et al. (2002) found job dissatisfaction increased markedly among physicians in
Massachusetts between 1996 and 1999, driven by perceived external influence on
practice decisions. Misra, Modawal, and Panigrahi (2009) researched experiences of
Asian-Indian physicians and found those serving the lowest percentage of MCO
patients had the highest satisfaction scores. Tietze and Sinha (2003) found perceptions
of managed care were higher for health administrators than physicians in areas with a
high managed care penetration.
A couple of papers written after the backlash provide perspective on whether the
regulations changed provider sentiment of managed care. Kronebusch, Schlesinger,
and Thomas (2009) found physicians reported their autonomy was less constrained due
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to certain backlash regulations. Likewise, Hargraves and Pham (2003) found specialists
reported more freedom to provide patients with necessary, but found no change in the
percentage of PCPs reporting independence in their clinical decision-making. The
authors suggest the enhanced feelings of freedom by specialists were due to relaxed
constraints from MCOs, likely due to the backlash. The studies in this subtheme
emphasize that provider sentiment towards managed care was mostly negative by the
mid-1990s and throughout the era of the backlash.
Theme 1c. Consumerism in health care.
The third subtheme describes managed care and the subsequent backlash in
terms of the growing importance of consumerism in health care. Consumer-driven
health care describes the desire for more individual control over health care choices
(Robinson & Ginsburg, 2009). As alluded to in Theme 1a, a number of papers
characterized the backlash as a response to patient choices being limited. However,
Enthoven et al. (2001) found that satisfaction with health insurance plans was more
likely to be correlated with the number of choices available to an employee, regardless
of whether plans were FFS or managed care. The authors suggest managed care
thrived in many areas before the backlash and dissatisfaction was related to the move
by many employers to offer only one insurance option in the 1990s, many of which were
MCOs. A study on HMO market penetration trends by Marquis, Rogowski, and Escarce
(2004) lends supports to this claim. Specifically, the authors found people in managed
care plans tended to be satisfied with their care overall and chose to remain enrolled
with the MCO even when a FFS option was available.
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The consensus from many health care consumerism articles was patient choice
of health care plans and providers constitute an important part of patient expectations
and satisfaction with care. Barry and Ridgely (2008) found the provision of mental
health services by MCOs was expanded in response to increased coverage by FFS
insurance. And Tai-Seale and Pescosolido (2003) found the ability to choose providers
was significantly related to positive patient opinion of their physician. The authors
argued that enhancing consumer choice could improve public sentiment of health care if
it translated into increased patient satisfaction.
Theme 1d. Regulations and the evolution of managed care.
The final subtheme discusses the evolving concepts of managed care and how
the backlash and regulations changed MCOs over time. Miller (2006) found managed
care and gatekeeping encouraged efficiency in the health care sector by preventing
people from “doctor shopping,” which resulted in extraneous spending from
unnecessary procedures and medications. Sekhri (2000) suggested managed care
positively transformed the US healthcare system in the 1990s by lowering costs and
emphasizing preventative care. Musser (1997) noted that although early versions of
physician-run MCOs often ran into issues cutting costs and instituting mechanisms for
quality control, with time other MCO models proved to be more effective as MCOs
relented on utilization constraints. Simon, White, Gamliel, and Kletke (1997) describe
the impact of managed care on scope of practice and the provision of primary care
services. They found that specialists were spending less time on primary care and
PCPs were spending more time on primary care as managed care penetration
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increased, which they suggested would create efficiencies and potentially better quality
of care.
The backlash caused significant changes in health plan approaches for
controlling utilization while maintaining quality, according to interviews with insurance
administrators (Felt-Lisk & Mays, 2002). Gatekeeping began to focus on improving
disease management, especially for people with certain chronic conditions (Felt-Lisk &
Mays, 2002). Mays and Claxton (2007) provide empirical evidence that disease
management programs offered by insurance companies increased post-backlash, while
Fang, Liu, and Rizzo (2009) find that gatekeeping did not diminish after the backlash.
Less restrictive forms of managed care began flourishing in the mid-1990s, especially
preferred provider organizations (PPOs) (Shi & Singh, 2014). National data on employer
insurance coverage showed PPOs accounted for about one third of insurance coverage
for private employees in 1997, but covered the majority of employees by 2003 (Cooper,
Simon, & Vistnes, 2006). As with an HMO, a PPO utilizes a network of providers and
pays using discounted fees, but patients can go outside of the network in exchange for
paying a higher share of the cost. Hirth, Grazier, Chernew, and Okeke (2007) found that
when employees at the University of Michigan were first offered a PPO, people with
FFS insurance were more likely to switch to the PPO versus HMO enrollees. The
authors argue this is because HMO enrollees were satisfied with their care and the
negative sentiment regarding managed care was not a major deterrent for the FFS
enrollees that switched.
Noble and Brennan (1999) suggest the variation in state regulations eventually
converged towards a shared view of what managed care should look like. Mays (2004)
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found many MCOs in the mid-2000s reintroduced many of the strategies criticized
during the backlash after costs rapidly increased, like requiring prior authorization
Konetzka, Zhu, Sochalski, and Volpp (2008) found high managed care penetration
stopped serving as an indicator of relatively lower cost growth by 2001, arguing the
effects of managed care on lowering hospital costs were diminished post-backlash. In
general, these studies found the backlash forced MCOs to change many of their most
restrictive practices, such as gag orders and financial incentives to providers, even
though these were the same strategies that were most effective at constraining health
care spending.
Theme 1. Summary.
Theme 1 describes the motivation for the managed care backlash, including how
provider sentiment towards managed care changed over time, increasing health care
consumerism in the 1990s, and the general evolution of managed care. Research found
the backlash regulations stemmed partly from genuine concerns over quality of care for
managed care enrollees, especially the three key outcome variables in this study:
access to care, patient satisfaction, and confidence in providers. However, research
also shows biased media coverage, increasingly limited options of employer-sponsored
health insurance, and negative provider sentiment towards MCOs also contributed to
the public outcry that led to many of the regulations. Although the backlash changed
certain aspects of managed care, other aspects remained the same (emphasis on
preventative care) or were eventually reintroduced (financial incentives). In fact,
enrollment in managed care increased since the backlash, but mostly to less restrictive
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PPO plans. Theme 2 discusses research on managed care quality during the height of
the backlash and beyond.
Theme 2. Quality of managed care.
The 2002 literature review by Miller and Luft is the most current synthesis of the
research on quality of care for managed care enrollees. In general, they found managed
care enrollees did not show significantly different outcomes compared with FFS
enrollees. In some ways, they found quality was better for managed care enrollees,
such as with preventative care. However, quality was usually worse when comparing
access to care and certain aspects of satisfaction with care. The papers included in their
review were often from the period before the backlash had completely taken hold (pre2000). The first subtheme in Theme 2 provides an update to this research, reviewing
empirical research on quality of care for managed care enrollees from 2001-forward,
when Miller and Luft’s last review left off. The second subtheme in Theme 2 reviews the
value and validity of using patient-reported outcomes (PROs) in health care quality
research. Although some of these articles do not directly relate to managed care
enrollees, they provide background and context for the PRO measures used in this
study. The last section describes the empirical papers that did not fit with the other
subthemes.
Theme 2a. Quality of care for managed care enrollees.
Empirical analyses of quality of care for managed care enrollees are discussed in
this subtheme. A similar coding scheme as the one developed by Miller and Luft (2002)
is used to organize the results of the studies identified in the literature search. Studies
were categorized as showing either positive results towards managed care enrollees,
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negative towards managed care enrollees, no difference versus the comparison group,
or having mixed results. In most cases, the analyses compared quality between
managed care and FFS beneficiaries, especially for private and Medicare analyses.
Other studies were panel analyses of patients transitioning from FFS to managed care,
usually single-state Medicaid analyses. Many papers used managed care penetration
as the key independent variable, but some used medical claims and surveys to gather
individual information about patients.
Forty empirical papers were reviewed, 23 of which related only to Medicare or
Medicaid managed care patients (Table 1). The patient outcomes analyzed in these
papers generally correspond to those used in past research on MCO quality, specifically
access to care and satisfaction with care. The studies from post-backlash did not
consistently have better or worse outcomes. Of the 40 papers, 14 found MCO enrollees
to have relatively better outcomes, while most showed mixed, negative, or no difference
in outcomes. Studies that included private MCO enrollees were more likely to show
positive MCO results (7/16) than studies with only Medicare and Medicaid patients
(7/23). Five of the 9 studies with negative MCO results related solely to public managed
care. Mixed results were also more likely to be related to Medicare and Medicaid. While
most of the data used in these studies were from during the backlash, a few were from
the mid- to late-2000s.
While the anti-managed care regulations apply to private MCOs in each state,
MCOs that contract with Medicare and Medicaid are mostly exempt (“mostly” because
preemption of federal regulations was challenged by some states). However, Pinkovskiy
(2014) suggests public MCOs likely experienced significant spillover from the backlash
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Table 1
Summary of Empirical Findings for Quality of Care for Managed Care Enrollees, Studies
Published between 2001 and 2016

Finding

Positive,
MCO

Negative,
MCO

Same or
No
Difference

Number
of Studies

14

9

8

Medicare
or
Medicaid
MCO

7

5

3

MCO only
(transition
to or from
FFS)

Studies, by First Author and Year
of Publication

4

Berman 2005, Blanc 2003, Daley
2005, Garrett 2005,
Gowrisankaran 2003, Jiang 2013,
Kane 2004, Luft 2003, Mitchell
2004, Nicholas 2013, Paul 2013,
Rogowski 2007, Roohan 2006,
Zhan 2004

2

Aizer 2007, Dwyer 2012,
Garwood 2008, Haile 2002, Kerr
2004, Lopez de Fete 2010, Porell
2001, Thompson 2003, Xu 2007

0

Backus 2001, Bian 2006, Chen
2010, Keyes 2001, Kim 2007,
Mark 2005, Porell 2001, Pracht
2011

Fox 2003, Hewner 2016, Kahana
2004, Kane 2005, Laditka 2000,
Safran 2002, Skinner 2007,
Slutsman 2002, Smith 2005

Mixed

8

6

6

Total

40

24

12
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regulations, such that MCOs offering public or private coverage operated under similar
guidelines. Regardless, these results suggest the distinction between private and public
managed care is important to consider when studying patient outcomes.
Patients tended to be satisfied with their overall care, regardless of their
insurance coverage. This finding is consistent with what Miller and Luft (1997 & 2002)
found in their earlier reviews. Many of the mixed results related to access to care,
usually specific to public MCO patients or to accessing services from specialists.
Mortality and confidence in provider were not as commonly-studied as satisfaction and
access, though a few papers reported significant findings. Dwyer, Liu, and Rizzo (2012)
studied whether HMO and FFS patients reported a difference in how much they trust
their physicians, defined as having confidence in the provider. Using a survey from
2001, the authors found HMO patients had relatively less trust in their providers which
the authors equated with lower quality of care.
The overall findings of this subtheme are similar to Miller and Luft (2002) in that
the results are mostly mixed. While there are many cases of positive results for MCO
enrollees, there are more cases of negative and mixed results. Though MCO enrollees
were still found to have issues with access to care, especially specialty services, overall
satisfaction was found to be generally high for all patients. Additionally, whether the
studies examined private or public managed care appeared to be an important
mediating factor in the results, with public managed care patient having worse patient
outcomes more often than private managed care patients.

30

Theme 2b. The value and validity of patient-reported outcomes in health
quality research.
The second subtheme in Theme 2 focuses on the value and validity of using
patient-reported outcomes (PROs) in health care quality research. Many of the articles
describe quality of care as relating to a multitude of factors. Matchar et al. (2008)
describes PROs as necessary to comprehensively measure quality of care for some
patients, such as those with frequent and severe headaches. Schatz et al. (2005) find
patient experience for asthma patients is comprised of important aspects usually not
considered in traditional research, such as level of concern over access to medication.
Bender and Garfinkel’s (2001) analysis of Medicare patients with MCO and FFS
insurance identified three distinctive areas of patient-reported quality: provider
communication, access to services, and plan administration. Ko and Coons (2005)
described a myriad of quality of life concerns that impact older adults with common
chronic conditions, such as functioning and wellbeing. Hazelhurst, McBurnie, Mularski,
Puro, and Chauvie (2012) argue that measuring quality of care requires comprehensive
information on patient services and health status, something MCOs are better equipped
to handle because they already have standardized systems in place. Beckles et al.
(2007) found patient self-reports of health care services often do not match their
medical claims, suggesting physicians do not have access to accurate information on
their patients, which could lead to lower quality of care.
Certain patient experiences were found to correspond closely with perceptions of
quality. Pifer et al. (2003) found mental quality of life for managed care patients was
positively correlated with satisfaction with financial aspects of their coverage, but not
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other clinical quality measures. Born and Query (2004) found that patient complaints
against MCOs were often correlated with truly poor quality. And Price, Elliott, Cleary,
Zaslavsky, and Hays (2014) found positive patient experiences were correlated with
behaviors and decisions that resulted in better outcomes.
A couple articles show that perceptions of quality can differ depending on the
specific factor being studied. Newacheck et al. (2001) found that patients sometimes
reported high overall satisfaction even if they also reported issues with access to care.
Likewise, sick and healthy patients within the same health plan sometimes provided
different responses about their health insurance (Zaslavsky & Cleary, 2002).
The impact of PROs on physician practice and behaviors was discussed in a
number of papers. During the backlash, a high percentage (70%) of MCOs reported
utilizing patient satisfaction surveys for substance and mental health services, even
more than clinical outcomes assessments (49%) (Merrick, Garnick, Horgan, & Hodgkin,
2002). From 1997 to 2001, physicians reported that patient satisfaction feedback had an
increasingly significant impact on the way they practice (Strunk & Reschovsky, 2002).
Likewise, Callahan, Fein, and Battleman (2002) found providers overwhelmingly
reported that patient feedback useful, though only about half said it would influence their
practice. Thompson, Ryan, Pinidiya, and Bost (2003) found MCOs that publicly divulged
performance measures were more likely to be high-performing, though this could reflect
correlation instead of causality. Huesch (2009) noted that MCOs may have difficulty
measuring quality of providers when samples sizes are small, such as with cardiac
surgeons, limiting the usefulness of PROs in these cases.
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A few papers discussed PROs in context of the patient-centeredness movement.
Frankel and Hourigan (2004) found focus groups were often useful to determine the true
nature of patient satisfaction and to achieve “patient-centeredness.” Nutting et al. (2005)
found primary care interventions were associated with higher rates of suicide detection
in depressed patients, suggesting a more hands-on approach to care results in better
outcomes. Similarly, home assessments were found to be correlated with better
dementia caregiver outcomes, while a negative correlation was found when the
caregiver was assigned to a community agency (Connor et al., 2008). The authors
suggest the in-house, one-on-one interaction was important for realizing positive
outcomes for both the dementia patient and the caregiver.
Theme 2c. Assorted empirical research on managed care quality and cost.
The last section covers a few areas of research not covered in the other
subthemes relating to managed care quality and the cost of care. A couple cost studies
highlight the benefits of managed care. Bloom et al. (2002) found that cost of care for
the mentally ill in Colorado was relatively lower in Medicaid managed care areas than in
areas with mostly FFS Medicaid. And Goetghebeur, Forrest, and Hay (2003) attributed
rises in inpatient hospital costs to loosening utilization restrictions by MCOs. However,
other papers found managed care was not always the cheapest option. Buntin, Garber,
McClellan, and Newhouse (2004) found Medicare MCOs kept costs relatively low by
avoiding costly patients, specifically those who are terminally ill. McGuire, Newhouse,
and Sinaiko (2011) found Medicare MCOs were paradoxically paid relatively higher
payments for some services than FFS insurance. Additionally, Shenkman, Tian,
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Nackashi, and Schatz (2005) found physicians paid mostly by MCOs were more likely to
refer children to specialists versus physicians paid mostly with FFS insurance.
A few papers describe the potential for managed care rationing and utilization
restrictions to negatively affect patient outcomes. Ridgely, Giard, Shern, Mulkern, and
Burnam (2002) found managed care impacted the process of substance abuse care
delivery by restricting services, medications, and employment. Albrecht’s (2001)
qualitative study on the experience of people with disabilities characterized their care as
rationed and low-quality due to MCO restrictions on covered services. Likewise, MCO
practices were found to negatively influence the treatment of substance abuse due to
reduced patient autonomy (Ghose, 2008). Writing during the backlash, Fournier and
McInnes (2002) surmised referrals required by many MCOs shielded the reputation of
poor-performing doctors and perpetuated low quality. Studdert, Bhattacharya,
Schoenbaum, Warren, and Escarce (2002) found physicians were half as likely to
choose an MCO for their own insurance as non-physicians. The authors suggest this is
due to physicians’ negative experience with MCO rationing in their practice.
However, some papers found little difference in quality between MCO and FFS
patients. Ma, Coleman, Fish, Lin, and Kramer (2004) found acute care elderly patients
with FFS and MCO insurance were both as likely to receive fractured care
(characterized by multiple transfers between health care settings). Additionally, one
study found patient quality ratings for restrictive MCOs were essentially the same as the
FFS control group, excepting pain patients who reported issues with access to specialty
services (Grembowski et al., 2007). Willging, Waitzkin, and Wagner (2005) determined
many of the preventative care services covered by MCOs were not accessible in rural
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areas because of a lack of providers in the MCO network. These papers indicate
managed care restrictions translated to unsatisfactory care for some segment of
enrollees.
A few papers described managed care success stories and the need for more
research comparing FFS insurance with managed care. Kyes, Wickizer, and Franklin
(2003) found employer satisfaction with employee health care was higher with MCO
plans than FFS insurance. A systematic review found managed care reduced
emergency department utilization in 10 of 12 studies (Morgan, Chang, Alqatari, & Pines,
2013). Mukamel, Weimer, Zwanziger, and Mushlin (2002) found evidence MCOs
contracted with cardiac surgeons of relatively higher quality, as measured by mortality
rates, because higher quality translated to fewer readmissions and less spending. One
article described Medicaid managed care in North Carolina in largely positive terms
because MCOs were subject to regulations and held accountable, unlike FFS insurance
(Shipman, 2012). One paper on long-term care services identified the transition from
FFS to managed care insurance as the most important topic in need of research in the
field of long-term care (Kaye & Harrington, 2015).
Theme 2. Summary.
Theme 2 reviews empirical research on quality of managed care from 2001forward. The empirical evidence remains mixed as to whether quality of care is relatively
better or worse for managed care enrollees versus people with traditional FFS
insurance. However, the research finds that access to specialty services, and services
for people with special needs, continues to be a problem for managed care enrollees.
Aside from studies covering traditional comparisons of MCO and FFS enrollees, papers
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describing the value and validity of using PROs in health care quality research emerged
as a distinct area of research. These papers defined health care quality using a
combination of factors that are often unmeasured or underutilized in practice, including
incorporating patient reports of quality into care decisions. The final subtheme reviews
various empirical research on managed care quality and cost of care. Many papers
analyzed MCO costs and utilization, with mixed sentiment on their future in the postbacklash era.
Summary and Rationale for Formulating an Analytic Framework
The managed care backlash dominated the health care discussion in the midand late-1990s. Patient protection was identified as the impetus behind many of the
backlash regulations (Hall, 2004), though many other factors are identified in the
literature as motivating and perpetuating the backlash. As Miller and Luft (2002) found
in the early 2000s, and Theme 2 of this review confirms is still accurate, evidence
shows that quality of care is not clearly better or worse for managed care enrollees.
Nonetheless, states passed hundreds of anti-managed care regulations to water down
or eliminate many of the strategies used by MCOs to reduce costs and streamline care.
These same strategies are increasingly used in value-based and accountable care
delivery models emanating from the ACA (Highfill & Ozcan, 2016).
Despite the effort undertaken to pass the backlash regulations, limited research
exists on whether the regulations ever achieved their intended outcome of enhancing
quality of care for managed care patients. The few articles that did study the impact of
the backlash regulations often focused on individual laws or used imprecise and
unreliable data. Sloan et al.’s (2005) research on the backlash regulations is the most
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relevant study of the impact of these laws, but their analysis ends at 2001 and the
authors admit the data used were not ideal for discerning effects. This study seeks to fill
this gap by analyzing data better suited for analyzing patient outcomes and analyzing a
longer time series. The themes described in this chapter are incorporated into the
conceptual framework and hypotheses of this study, presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter III: Conceptual Framework

The managed care backlash regulations passed in the mid-1990s and early
2000s sought to improve quality of care for managed care enrollees (Gray et al., 2007).
Quality of care is comprised of multiple areas or domains of care, ranging from clinical
outcomes, like mortality rates, to emotional well-being (Kane, 2006). The main
outcomes of this study relate directly to the areas of care quality considered lacking for
managed care enrollees during the backlash: access to care, confidence in provider,
and patient satisfaction with care (Miller & Luft 1997, 2002; Baker & McClellan, 2001).
The concepts for this study are organized using Donabedian’s structure, process,
outcome (SPO) framework, which serves as a common foundation for health care
quality research (Kane, 2006). The SPO framework describes how structural aspects of
care effect the processes of care for patients, which in turn impact patient outcomes
(Donabedian, 1980). Elements from economic theory are also incorporated into the
framework to help explain the motivation and potential effects of the backlash
regulations.
Structure of Care
In the SPO framework, structure describes fixed attributes of the health care
setting, such as equipment, and organizational characteristics, such as methods of care
reimbursement (Donabedian, 1988). Managed care is a structural factor because it
effects how health care is organized for enrollees. Specifically, all health care services
for managed care patients are arranged by a single provider, called a gatekeeper. This
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differs from how care is delivered with traditional indemnity insurance, where patients
visit the doctor of their choice.
Patient and environmental characteristics are also included as structural
components in the SPO framework. These characteristics represent fixed aspects of
health care delivery that impact health care utilization and patient outcomes outside of
organizational attributes of the care setting (Ridgley et al., 2002). Relevant patient
characteristics include medical history, insurance coverage, health status, income, and
basic demographic information (e.g., race, age). These characteristics have all been
shown to impact patient-reported outcomes (PROs), including patient satisfaction and
trust in provider (Ko & Coons, 2005; Grembowski et al., 2007; Pifer, 2003).
Environmental factors include geography, such as where a patient lives and the barriers
a patient faces when seeking health care services (Ly et al., 2010; Hearld et al., 2008).
For example, the supply of providers is often lower for people living in a rural setting,
making access to care more difficult than for people living in metropolitan areas (Chan,
Hart, & Goodman, 2006). Environmental factors also include laws with the potential to
impact health care, such as minimum nurse staffing ratios in hospitals and the managed
care backlash regulations, the variable of interest in this study.
Process of Care
The process dimension of the SPO framework encompasses the activities of
health care professionals and organizations when patients seek care. This involves
diagnosing, making recommendations, and implementing treatment (Donabedian,
1980). Processes of care for managed care enrollees differ from people with traditional
insurance because of the gatekeeping requirement. The gatekeeper or primary care
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physician (PCP) is responsible for coordinating all health care services for managed
care patients. Coordination of care involves approving, scheduling, and monitoring all
the health care services a patient receives (AHRQ, 2014). Patients with complicated
health care requirements, such as people with chronic conditions, have been shown to
have better clinical and financial outcomes when health care services are coordinated
through a gatekeeper (Smith, 2003). Additionally, consistent interactions between a
patient and provider can lead to enhanced communication, potentially improving patient
outcomes such as patient trust in provider and satisfaction with care (Street, et al.,
2009).
Gatekeeping requirements can sometimes introduce hurdles to receiving care.
Requiring a referral from a PCP for every specialist visit may seem unnecessary for
common medical services, such as the person seeking acne treatment from a
dermatologist or the woman seeking an annual pap smear from an OB/GYN. Managed
care patients have reported difficulty getting an appointment with their PCP if their MCO
provider network is limited (Phillips, et al., 2000). Additionally, gatekeepers may limit the
number or type of services they provide to managed care patients. In the 1990s, some
MCOs offered providers financial incentives to restrict the number of procedures they
provided to patients (Davidoff et al., 2007). Likewise, some PCPs were required to
undergo extensive reviews of their service utilization by MCOs. The goal of these
reviews was to reduce costs by cutting back on the use of services and procedures
(Rodwin, 1997).
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Outcomes of Care
The outcomes analyzed in this study are the PROs directly related to the source
of the managed care backlash: access to care, confidence in provider, and satisfaction
with care. As described in Miller and Luft (1997, 2002), and was confirmed in the
Literature Review, MCO enrollees reported relatively more problems accessing care
than FFS patients before and during the backlash. In addition to access problems, the
cost-driven focus of managed care undermined patient confidence in providers (Baker &
McClellan, 2001) and decreased satisfaction with care for MCO enrollees (Dugan,
2015).
Mortality is also included as an outcome in this study. Past research is mixed on
whether mortality for managed care patients differs from those with FFS insurance
(Miller & Luft, 2002). However, studies have shown PROs are often correlated with
clinical outcomes. For example, patients who are satisfied with their care or have
confidence in their PCP are more likely to adhere to treatments and engage in
behaviors associated with favorable medical outcomes (Zolnierek & Dimatteo, 2009;
Glickman et al., 2010; Street et al., 2009). To assess whether the backlash regulations
impacted clinical outcomes as well as PROs, mortality is also included in this study.
Backlash Regulations
Regulation is often considered to be a tool used by governments to respond to
market failures (Peltzman, Levine, & Noll, 1989). Sloan and Hall (2002) identified a
number of potential market failures in the MCO market (“consumer ignorance and
asymmetric information; imperfect risk adjustment; myopic orientation of health plans;
lack of consumer choice; and excessive standardization” (p.182)) suggesting that
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concerns by patients and providers were somewhat justified. While some of these
failures are also apparent in the market for traditional FFS insurance, lack of consumer
choice in care decisions and excessive standardization of care are hallmarks of
gatekeeping specific to managed care (Mechanic & Schlesinger, 1996). Accordingly,
many of the backlash regulations weakened gatekeeping restrictions to force MCOs to
operate more like traditional insurance.
All states passed at least one backlash regulation, but most states passed many
(Table 2). The backlash regulations impacted multiple aspects of care. Over half of
states passed laws allowing women to see an OB/GYN without first seeing their PCP,
permitting patients with chronic illnesses to visit long-standing specialists without a
referral, and ensuring patients with rare diseases could continue visiting their doctor
even if he/she left the MCO network (continuity of care). In 39 states, MCOs were
required to cover expenses for Emergency Room visits. Additionally, any willing
provider laws forced MCOs to accept into their network any provider that met certain
requirements, enlarging the pool of available doctors for MCO enrollees in 26 states. All
these laws provided patients with more control over their care choices and PCPs with
more time to engage in direct care for patients (as opposed to unnecessary visits for
specialist referrals), potentially leading to increased access to care and satisfaction with
provider.
A major aspect of the managed care backlash was patients’ belief that PCP
treatment decisions were influenced by MCOs at the expense of quality of care (Baker
& McClellan, 2001; Dugan, 2015). Many regulations attempted to remove MCOs from
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Table 2
Managed Care Regulation Types and Number of States Adopting by 2004
Type of Regulation

Number of States
Adopting

Direct access to OB-GYNs

39

Standing referrals to specialists

30

Continuity of care protections

36

Emergency room access under “prudent layperson” standard

39

Any willing provider law

26

Bans on gag rules

48

Comprehensive reform bill

46

Bans on provider financial incentives

31

HMO report card established

27

Graduated levels of internal review

40

Independent external review of appeals required

43

Ombudsman program

18

Liability: right to sue health plans for damages

10
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the decision-making by relaxing and removing constraints on care processes imposed
by MCOs. For example, banning gag rules was the most prevalent backlash regulation.
Gag rules prevented physicians from discussing treatments with patients that were not
covered by the MCO. Now PCPs could discuss all possible care choices with patients,
potentially improving or restoring trust in the patient-provider relationship.
Comprehensive reform legislation in many states prevented MCOs from conducting
utilization reviews of providers in which the sole purpose of the review was to cut
services. Additionally, most states banned MCOs from offering PCPs financial
incentives to limit the number of procedures they provided to patients. And about half of
states established report cards for managed care providers. These report cards
provided managed care patients with a metric to compare the care they received from
their PCP against a national average. Other backlash regulations granted patients the
right to appeal MCO care coverage decisions through both internal and external review
processes. Ombudsman programs were established to help address denial of service
claims. In ten states, patients were granted the right to sue MCOs for damages related
to denial of care. Again, these laws sought to give managed care patients more choice
in their care decisions by weakening MCO constraints that caused patient
dissatisfaction with care and a lack of confidence in providers.
Some of the backlash regulations had the potential to impact multiple PROs. For
example, laws banning gag rules may improve both confidence and satisfaction if
patients believe their PCPs are now discussing all possible treatment options with them.
Also, access and satisfaction may improve with any willing provider laws since those
regulations add more doctors to the MCO network and may make it easier to get an
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appointment. Consequently, all types of regulation are important to consider when
measuring their potential to impact patient outcomes. But even regulations of the same
type differed in scope, stringency, and level of enforcement across states. Gray et al.
(2007) found that language in some of the comprehensive reform backlash regulations
was so innocuous it was considered useless in practice. And Laugesen et al. (2006)
argued that backlash regulations were sometimes passed just to benefit the legislators
involved. Therefore, the different levels of regulatory severity or intensity should also be
considered when analyzing the effect of these laws on patient outcomes. The
conclusions presented in this Conceptual Framework and the Literature Review lead to
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash
regulations will show greater improvements in access to care than managed care
enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash
regulations will show greater improvements in confidence in provider than
managed care enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris
paribus.
Hypothesis 3. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash
regulations will show greater improvements in satisfaction with care than
managed care enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris
paribus.
Past research is mixed on whether mortality for managed care patients differed
from those with FFS insurance. Pinkovskiy’s (2014) study on the effects of backlash
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regulations did not find evidence of county-level mortality effects, though he admits the
data and model used were not ideal for studying mortality. Since people with chronic
conditions can have better clinical outcomes when care is coordinated through a
gatekeeper, this may suggest weakening gatekeeping could negatively impact patient
health. On the other hand, research has shown patient satisfaction and other PROs are
often correlated with clinical outcomes, suggesting improvements in PROs and mortality
should be related. Since most people do not have complicated health care
requirements, the evidence does not suggest the managed care regulations should
impact overall patient mortality, leading to the last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Managed care enrollees in states with more intense backlash
regulations will not show different mortality outcomes than managed care
enrollees in states with less intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus.
Conclusion
This study investigates changes in patient outcomes arising from the managed
care regulatory backlash. The concepts for this study are organized using an enhanced
version of Donabedian’s SPO framework. The main hypothesis derived from this
framework states that PROs for managed care patients in states with a more intense
regulatory backlash will show greater improvements than PROs for managed care
patients in states with less intense regulations. The next chapter describes the methods
and data used to test this hypothesis. The variables identified in the conceptual
framework are incorporated into the empirical model to best isolate the effect of the
backlash regulations on patient outcomes.

46

Chapter IV: Methods

This study takes advantage of the variety of regulations enacted across states
during the managed care backlash of the late 1990s and early 2000s to investigate their
impact on quality of care for managed care enrollees. Four research questions ask how
the managed care regulatory backlash affected two domains of quality of care: patientreported outcomes and mortality. Specifically, did regulations improve quality of care for
managed care enrollees by improving access to care, confidence in providers, and
satisfaction with care, and lowering mortality? This chapter describes the research
design and methods used to answer these questions.
Research Design
Differences in patient outcomes between managed care and fee-for-service
(FFS) patients are compared over time as states enacted their managed care
regulations. Specifically, this study investigates the difference in outcomes for managed
care patients in states with low-intensity regulations relative to managed care patients in
states that moved to moderate and high intensity for 1996-2000 and 2000-2004. The
empirical design controls for changes that affected both FFS and managed care
enrollees over time that are not associated with differences in regulatory treatment,
such as the adoption of electronic health records.
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Data sources.
The four data sources used in this analysis are the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) from the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ); the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), linked to the National Death Index, from the
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS); data from the paper by Gray, Lowery,
and Godwin (2007), “Political Management of Managed Care: Explaining Variations in
State Health Maintenance Organization Regulations;” and the Area Health Research
File (AHRF) from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
MEPS. The MEPS contains the key variables used in this study: patient
experiences with health care and managed care coverage. Managed care variables are
not available for years 1997-1999, but are available for 1996 and 2000-forward. Most of
the environmental and patient characteristics described in the conceptual framework are
also taken from the MEPS, including geography, demographics, and health status. The
MEPS is a nationally representative two-year overlapping panel survey of health care
utilization and spending for non-institutionalized persons in the U.S (the institutionalized
account for a small share of the population, including those in nursing homes, prisons,
long-term psychiatric hospitals, and active military). MEPS sample size over the study
period ranged from 20,000-30,000 people each year, adults and children. A single
respondent answered questions for the entire household during multiple in-person
interviews. People who did not utilize health services are also included in the MEPS
sample, providing an inclusive sample of respondents. The first available year of MEPs
data is 1996, which is used as the base year in this study. Respondent survey weights
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account for the complex survey design of the MEPS, which oversamples certain
segments of the population.
NHIS. The NHIS is a 3-year overlapping panel survey from which MEPS
respondents are chosen that covers a variety of health care topics. The NHIS is linked
to the National Death Index, which provides mortality information for MEPS respondents
over age 18. Sample size for NHIS ranged from 75,000-85,000 people each year,
however there are only a couple hundred instances of mortality annually due to the low
occurrence of death in the general population (around 0.8% in 2014 (Centers for
Disease Control [CDC], 2015)).
Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2007). The Gray et al. paper analyzed variations in
state managed care regulations during the backlash period. The authors provided the
data used in their analysis, which consisted of matrices for each year and state that
showed the passage of each backlash regulation. These matrices incorporate weights
for stringency of regulation since Gray et al. determined that some regulations were
passed with differing degrees of enforcement and limited scope of providers. For
example, any willing provider laws only apply to pharmacists in some states. To account
for these differences, some regulations were given less importance than others such
that a regulation could have a value anywhere between 0.28 and 1. Gray et al.
determined the details for each regulation from the sources listed in Table 3. Many of
these sources are databases run by non-profit or professional groups, such as the
Kaiser Family Foundation.
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Table 3
Data Sources Used to Identify Managed Care Backlash Regulations, by Type of
Regulation, Gray et al. (2007)
1. Access to Ob-Gyns: Kaiser Family Foundation. 2004. State Mandated Benefits:
Direct Access to OB/Gyns, 2004.
2. Any Willing Provider: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Any Willing Provider.
Issue Brief, Year End Report. December 31.
3. Bans on Provider Financial Incentives: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Bans
on Financial Incentives. Issue Brief, Year End Report. December 31.
4. Continuity of Care: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Continuity of Care. Issue
Brief, Year End Report. December 31.
5. External Review Requirements: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Consumer
Grievance Procedures: Internal and Independent Appeals. Issue Brief, Year End
Report. December 31.
6. Gag Bans: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Bans on Gag Clauses. Issue
Brief, Year End Report, December 31.
7. Internal Review: Health Policy Tracking Service. 2003. Consumer Grievance
Procedures: Internal and Independent Appeals. Issue Brief, Year End Report.
8. Liability Regulations: National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) Managed
Care Insurer Liability.
9. Ombudsman and Report Cards: NCSL Managed Care Insurer State Laws for
Ombudsman, Report Cards and Provider Profiles.
10. Standing Referral to Specialists: Kaiser Family Foundation. 2004. Patients’ Rights:
Standing Referrals for Ongoing Care with a Specialist, 2004.
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Four states passed managed care regulations after 2003, the latest year covered
in the Gray et al. paper. The National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) is a
bipartisan organization that maintains a table of managed care laws, categorized by
state, year of implementation, and type of regulation (NCSL, 2011). Information from the
NCSL website was used in this analysis to update the matrix from the Gray et al. (2007)
paper and account for changes that occurred to laws after 2003. This includes the
addition of 6 various laws by 4 states and the repeal of liability laws in 10 states in 2004
after the Supreme Court ruled against them.
AHRF. The AHRF is a meta-database of various government statistics compiled
by the Health Resources and Services Administration under the Department of Health
and Human Services. The AHRF data is used to determine the barrier to care variable
for each person, specifically, whether they live in a county with a PCP shortage. A
severe shortage impacts the whole county and a partial shortage impacts part of the
county.
Sampling.
The MEPS asks respondents about characteristics of their insurance coverage.
This includes whether they are enrolled in an HMO plan or if they are required to use a
gatekeeper. If people responded affirmatively to either of those questions, they are
identified as having managed care coverage. People with insurance that is not
managed care are classified as having traditional FFS insurance in this study.
Uninsured individuals are excluded from the analysis.
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Measurement of variables.
Independent Variables. The key independent variable is the interaction of
whether a person was a managed care enrollee and a measure of state regulatory
intensity. The intensity score measures the scope and breadth of each state’s
regulations contingent on three factors: number, stringency, and rarity. The regulation
data provided by Gray et al. were already weighted for stringency such that each state
regulation was given a value at 1 or less. They determined stringency weights by
accounting for differing levels of enforcement and scope of laws across states. To
account for rarity of regulations, a Saidin index was also applied. The Saidin index gives
more weight to a phenomenon when it is relatively less common (Spetz & Baker, 1999).
Giving rare regulations more weight distinguishes them from more commonplace laws.
This corresponds to the finding by Sloan and Hall (2002) that states that passed rarer
backlash regulations had the strongest overall packages of laws and were favored by
consumer advocates. For this study, the Saidin rarity index is found using the proportion
of states that did not pass a certain type of law. For example, 48 out of 50 states passed
a law banning gag orders. The Saidin index value for this regulation is [1 – (48/50)] =
0.04 (Table 4). The low weight of 0.04 reflects how common the law was. Formally, the
intensity score for each state is determined by the weighted sum of adopted backlash
regulations (the weights being the Saidin index and stringency weights from Gray et al.).
The scores are cumulative and only decrease over time if a law was repealed. The
regulatory intensity categories (low, moderate, and high) were determined from
distribution of state intensity scores in 2004, when regulatory activity ended. Low
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Table 4
Managed Care Regulation Types and the Saidin Index
Type of Regulation

Number of
States Adopting

Saidin Index

Bans on gag rules

48

0.04

Comprehensive reform bill

46

0.08

Independent external review of appeals required

43

0.14

Graduated levels of internal review

40

0.20

Direct access to OB-GYNs

39

0.22

Emergency room access under “prudent layperson”
standard

39

0.22

Continuity of care protections

36

0.28

Bans on provider financial incentives

31

0.38

Standing referrals to specialists

30

0.40

HMO report card established

27

0.46

Any willing provider law

26

0.48

Ombudsman program

18

0.64

Liability: right to sue health plans for damages

10

0.80
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intensity is represented by scores in the first quartile, moderate intensity are scores in
the middle two quartiles and high intensity are scores in the last quartile. States were
categorized as having low, moderate, or high intensity regulations based on their
intensity score in each year of the study (1996, 2000, and 2004). Table 5 illustrates that
all states begin in the low-intensity regulation category in 1996 and most shift to
moderate- or high-intensity regulation states by 2004 (Figures 1 & 2).
Table 5
Number of States in each Category of Regulatory Intensity, after Stringency and Rarity
Weights Applied
Year

Low

Moderate

High

1996

50

2000

22

22

6

2004

13

24

13

Figure 1. Number of State Managed Care Backlash Regulations Passed by Year,
Weighted by Stringency, 1994-2004
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Figure 2. Managed Care Regulatory Backlash Intensity Graphs, 1996-2004
Note: L=low-intensity regulation state, M=moderate, and H=high
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Applying the Saidin index impacted the categorization of 14 out of 50 states.
Eight states moved into a higher category, either from low- to moderate-intensity or
moderate- to high-intensity. This often reflected the passage of regulations that were
rarer, like adopting an ombudsman program. Six states moved into a lower category
when the Saidin index was applied, moving from moderate- to low-intensity or high- to
moderate-intensity. This normally happened in states that passed multiple
commonplace regulations.
The other characteristic used to identify our key independent variable is whether
a person has managed care. A MEPS respondent can describe an insurance plan as an
HMO and/or as a gatekeeper plan. In addition, a respondent can have insurance
coverage for the whole year or for part of the year (available in monthly intervals). The
monthly interval data show some respondents had both HMO and FFS insurance in the
same year, so the sample is restricted to those with full-year insurance coverage to
avoid patients with overlap. Therefore, the final definition for a managed care patient
used in this study is someone with an HMO or gatekeeper plan that had insurance
coverage for the entire year.
Dependent Variables. Nine PROs from the MEPS are examined for the 19962000 period and three for the 2000-2004 period (Table 6). Mortality is also examined
using data from the NHIS. Only three of the PROs are available in the second period
owing to a change in the survey questions in 2001. People were asked about their usual
source of care, simplified hereafter to “Doctor” (MEPS, 2004). Questions asking about
difficulty or satisfaction had four potential options (very difficult, somewhat difficult, not
too difficult, not at all difficult; very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied, not at
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all satisfied). In those cases, responses were transformed to binary so that “not at all
difficult,” “very satisfied,” and “somewhat satisfied” were set to positive (1) and all other
responses set to negative (0). The other survey questions were already binary.
Table 6
Patient-reported Outcomes and Mortality—Dependent Variables

Patient Outcome

Survey Questions

Doctor has night or weekend hours
Patient has no difficulty contacting Doctor by phone
Access to Care

Patient has no difficulty getting an appointment*
Patient has no difficulty accessing care*
Patient is satisfied with ability to access care*

Confidence in
Providers

Satisfaction with
Care

Mortality

Doctor asks patient about other treatments he/she is taking
Doctor listens to patient*
Patient is confident in Doctor*

Patient is satisfied with care*

Patient did not die during survey year or year after

Note: Survey questions marked with an asterisk (*) are only available in 1996 and 2000
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Access to care is assessed using five survey questions. Two questions ask about
difficulty and satisfaction with access to care. The other three questions ask about
specific aspects of access to care, including difficulty making an appointment, difficulty
contacting the Doctor on the phone, and availability of Doctor during night and weekend
hours. Though these questions seem similar, summary statistics show the responses
can be different (see Table 8a in the Results chapter). For example, 90% of MC
enrollees in 1996 reported no difficulty accessing care, but only 43% reported no
difficulty getting an appointment. Thus, the access to care variables are analyzed
individually and not aggregated into a single access measure.
Confidence in providers is operationalized using three survey questions (Table
6). One question asks if the respondent is confident in his/her provider, another asks if
the Doctor listens, and the last question is whether the Doctor asks patients about other
treatments they are taking. This last question is relevant because research has shown
patients are confident in providers who are respectful, listen, and include the patient in
the decision-making process (Verbeek et al., 2004). Only the last question was asked in
both periods. Satisfaction with care is asked about directly and mortality is determined
by whether the person survived in the survey year and year after.
Control Variables. The control variables include the structural characteristics
described in the conceptual framework. The factors are operationalized using standard
measures from previous research. Specifically, barriers to care are represented using
indicators for whether the person lives in a county with a severe or partial PCP shortage
and whether the person lives in a metropolitan area (White, Bazzoli, Roggenkamp, &
Gu, 2005). The relevant health and demographic information include race, gender,
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marital status, individual income, education, Hispanic heritage, self-reported poor
health, pre-existing chronic condition indicator, and Medicare or Medicaid status. These
variables were all represented with binary indicators except income, which was
transformed to constant-2004 dollars using the overall Consumer Price Index.
Observations were dropped if values were missing for age, education or
metropolitan area, which was relatively uncommon (1% of observations). However,
missing values for income was more common (65% of observations), so those values
were imputed rather than losing those observations. The average annual income for
each reference group (FFS and MCO for high/moderate/low-intensity category) was
used in place of missing values (n=). More sophisticated imputation techniques for
income that incorporate race and health status were not pursued due to the relatively
small sample sizes of minority subpopulations in some reference groups.
Validity and Reliability. Validity is addressed in this model first by operationalizing
constructs using common concepts and definitions from past research as outlined in the
conceptual framework. These constructs are included in the model to help control for
confounders and isolate the true effect of regulations. Also, the reliability of the outcome
variables is enhanced by using questions asked in the same manner, from the same
survey, for all years of the analysis.
Methods of Procedures for Hypothesis Testing
A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach is used to address the
research question. Using the DDD model, differences in patient outcomes between
managed care and FFS patients are compared over time as states enacted their
managed care regulations. This empirical design controls for changes that affected both
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FFS and managed care enrollees unrelated to regulatory treatment, such as changes in
health over time.
Most of the managed care regulations were passed between 1996-2000 and
were usually implemented within a year of being passed. A few dozen regulations were
enacted prior to 1996. Data availability prevents the use of an earlier base year, though
it would not impact this analysis given how few regulations were passed at the time. The
end of the backlash period is often considered to be between 2001-2002 (Sloan et al.,
2005), but 2004 marks the last year of significant regulatory activity. Therefore, two
periods are examined, 1996-2000 and 2000-2004.
Analytical strategies.
Logistic regressions are run separately for each binary dependent variable.
Combining the five access to care and three confidence in provider variables into
individual composite variables was ruled out because each variable captures different
aspects of each outcome. These DDD regressions measure the change in outcomes for
managed care patients in states with low-intensity regulations relative to patients in
states that switched to moderate- and high-intensity, controlling for changes in
corresponding FFS patients. Robust standard errors (SEs) are calculated to account for
the complex survey design of MEPS which oversamples certain segments of the
population. Since all states are considered low intensity in 1996, the 1996-2000
regression varies slightly from the 2000-2004 regression. Formula 1 is for the first
period, 1996-2000, and Formula 2 is for the second period, 2000-2004.The DDD
parameter for 2000-2004 is MC*High*2004, but this interaction is dropped in 1996-2000
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because MC*High*2000 is collinear with MC*High (since no state was considered highintensity in 1996).
Formula 1. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 2000 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑎2 2000 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
Formula 2. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1 2004 + 𝛾1 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑐2 2004 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐3 2004 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾5 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 +
𝑐4 2004 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐5 2004 ∗ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
β4 and β5 are the parameters of interest for 1996-2000
c4 and c5 are the parameters of interest for 2000-2004
Outcome = PROs and mortality
MC = managed care dummy (MC=1 for MC enrollees)
Moderate = moderate intensity regulation state dummy (Moderate=1 for states with
moderate-intensity regulations)
High = high intensity regulation state dummy (High=1 for states with high-intensity
regulations)
F = vector of control variables
Sensitivity analysis.
Ideally, a sensitivity test would be conducted to quantify the impact of using the
Saidin rarity index. Running the analysis excluding the Saidin Index would present a
more comparable model to past research on the backlash regulations which do not
include the Saidin index (Sloan et al., 2005; Pinkovskiy 2014). However, due to data
confidentiality issues, robustness checks could not be run on the categorization of
states into different intensity categories. State-level MEPS data are confidential and due
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to restrictions on the data, only one categorization of states was authorized for this
study. The concern by AHRQ was that an individual state could be identified if the
results of different categorizations of states were compared. Therefore, different
categorizations of state regulatory intensities could not be tested.
Limitations.
Despite the care taken in designing this study, there are important limitations to
consider. There were three main issues that arose from using the MEPS data. First,
identifying managed care enrollees is not possible in the MEPS for 1997-1999.
Therefore, those years cannot be included in this analysis to test for effects using
different time periods. Second, the survey changed in 2001 and questions were no
longer asked about satisfaction with care and about most aspects of confidence in
provider. This prevented a comparison of these outcomes between the first and second
period. Finally, like many health care surveys, the MEPS has issues with non-response
and under-representation of certain populations, such as the very sick (Zuvekas & Olin,
2009). This is important because people who are sick are more likely to report
dissatisfaction with care and have different responses to other PROs (Zaslavsky &
Cleary, 2002). This issue was addressed by including variables for old age, severe
disabilities, and chronic conditions.
Though the empirical strategy in this study attempts to control for as many
confounders as possible, the model contains certain drawbacks. The timing, number,
and interrelatedness of regulations prevents an analysis of the impact of individual laws
on patient outcomes. Therefore, the causal link between the regulations and any
observed enhancements in quality is somewhat limited since improvements cannot be
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attributed to specific laws. In addition, if omitted variable bias is present and unobserved
factors are influencing both the intensity of the backlash and patient outcomes, then
endogeneity may be an issue. However, Gray et al. (2007) and Pinkovskiy (2014) find
no evidence that MC enrollees in states that passed more regulations had worse
outcomes prior to the backlash, weakening the endogeneity argument. Additionally, the
DDD model used in this study controls for changes in corresponding FFS patients
during the backlash, providing an additional level of control to combat omitted variable
bias. The next chapter describes the results of this analysis, including a summary of the
descriptive statistics and regression results.
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Chapter V: Results

Differences in patient outcomes between managed care (MC) and fee-for-service
(FFS) enrollees are compared over time as states enacted regulations specific to
managed care organizations during the period known as the “managed care backlash.”
To start this chapter, summary statistics are described for key variables across the
sample. The results of the hypothesis testing are then presented. A detailed discussion
of policy implications and limitations to this study are presented in the next chapter.
Summary Statistics
Table 7 provides the unweighted sample sizes by insurance status and
regulatory intensity category for each year represented in the analysis. Overall, the
MEPS sample size of people with any health insurance increased from 19,142 in 1996
to 28,635 by 2004. Of those three years, managed care enrollment was highest in 2000,
when 44% of MEPS respondents with insurance reported having managed care. By
2004, low-intensity states had the smallest sample sizes, especially for MC enrollees
(n=850, or 3% of annual sample).
Tables 8a-c show the summary statistics of demographic information by MC
status. The MEPS survey weights have been applied to these data to make them
nationally representative. Table 8a compares mean values for FFS and MC enrollees in
1996. Tables 8b-c are further delineated by regulatory intensity (low/moderate/high) for
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Table 7
Unweighted Sample Sizes by Insurance Type and State Regulatory Intensity

Managed Care

Fee-For-Service

Regulatory Intensity
Low

Moderate High

Total Sample

Regulatory Intensity
Total

Low

7,014

12,128

Moderate High

Regulatory Intensity
Total

Low

12,128

19,142

Moderate High

Total

(n)

65

1996

7,014

2000

1,926 3,951

3,474

9,351

3,623

4,635

3,657

11,915

5,549

8,586

7,131

21,266

2004

850

4,425

8,912

3,007

7,566

9,150

19,723

3,857

11,203

13,575

28,635

37

63

63

100

3,637

19,142

(%)
1996

37

100

2000

9

19

16

44

17

22

17

56

26

40

34

100

2004

3

13

15

31

11

26

32

69

13

39

47

100

Table 8a
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status, 1996 (standard deviation)
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service

33
(22)

37†
(27)

51

53†

Black

11

13†

White

83

83†

Other

6

4†

Hispanic (%)

9

10†

Married (%)

48

40†

No high school degree

32

43†

High school

40

37†

College

28

19†

Chronic condition prevalence (%)

26

34†

Self-reported bad health (%)

6

13†

Lives in metropolitan area (%)

88

70†

Age
Female (%)
Race (%)

66

Education (%)

(Table 8a continued)
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service

46

44

38

38

34,169

25,445†

Medicare disabled (%)

0.5

3.3†

Medicare aged (%)

4.4

Lives in county with severe PCP
shortage (%)
Lives in county with partial PCP
shortage (%)
Individual Income (constant-2004$)

67
†Significant

difference between MC and FFS (p<0.05)

17.8†

Table 8b
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory Intensity,
2000
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

High

33
(21)

33
(22)

32
(20)

38‡
(27)

39‡
(28)

38‡
(25)

52

50

52

52

53‡

54‡

12

11

14

12‡

12‡

15

White
Other
Hispanic (%)

87
2
3

86
4
6

77
8
19

86‡
2
3

84‡
4‡
7‡

78
7‡
25‡

Married (%)

48

46

45

44‡

39‡

37‡

Education (%)
No high school
degree
High school

32

35

36

41‡

42‡

47‡

42

38

36

40‡

38‡

33‡

26

27

28

19‡

20‡

20‡

32

28

25

40‡

41‡

40‡

6

6

6

14‡

13‡

12‡

Age
Female (%)
Race (%)

68

Black

College
Chronic condition
prevalence (%)
Self-reported bad
health (%)

(Table 8b continued)
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

High

69

Lives in metropolitan area
(%)

73

85

98

58‡

76‡

90‡

Lives in county with severe
PCP shortage (%)

34

43

48

38‡

48‡

48‡

44

40

36

45

37‡

31‡

34,756
(33,739)

36,660
(24,556)

38,018
(25,529)

27,390‡
(23,599)

27,017‡
(22,245)

27,045‡
(26,378)

Medicare disabled (%)

0.7

0.7

0.6

3.5‡

4.9‡

3.6‡

Medicare aged (%)

3.4

4.3

3.9

19.1‡

22.2‡

19.5‡

Lives in county with partial
PCP shortage (%)
Individual Income (constant2004$)

‡Significant

difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05)

Table 8c
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Control Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory Intensity,
2004
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

High

35
(19)

34
(21)

34
(18)

38‡
(24)

38‡
(24)

38
(21)

49

51

51

52

53‡

53‡

Black

9

10

13

14‡

10‡

15‡

White

85

84

76

82‡

84‡

78

6

7‡

Age
Female (%)
Race (%)

70

6

6

11

4‡

Hispanic (%)

5

7

17

3‡

9‡

20‡

Married (%)

50

48

45

41‡

40‡

39‡

No high school degree

31

31

33

40‡

39‡

43‡

High school

43

37

37

38‡

39‡

34‡

26

31

30

22‡

22‡

23‡

33

37

33

43‡

42‡

42‡

7

7

7

13‡

12‡

12‡

Other

Education (%)

College
Chronic condition
prevalence (%)
Self-reported bad health
(%)

(Table 8c continued)
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

High

71

Lives in metropolitan area (%)

75

87

95

65‡

75‡

84‡

Lives in county with severe
PCP shortage (%)

36

51

37

43‡

56‡

38‡

Lives in county with partial
PCP shortage (%)

44

37

47

41

32‡

42‡

35,189
(21,775)

37,755
(25,124)

38,349
(26,766)

28,138‡
(21,831)

28,126‡
(21,028)

Medicare disabled (%)

0.5

0.6

0.5

4.3‡

4.6‡

4.4‡

Medicare aged (%)

4.1

3.9

4.4

16.7‡

17.8‡

17.1‡

Individual Income (constant2004$)

‡Significant

27,158‡
(20,915)

difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05)

2000 and 2004, respectively. T-tests (p <= 0.05) run on these means found statistically
significant differences for many demographic variables between MC and FFS enrollees
in states with the same regulatory intensity each year. In general, MC enrollees were
more likely to be younger, married, have higher incomes, have college degrees, and live
in a metropolitan area, and they were less likely to have a chronic condition or report
being in poor health relative to FFS enrollees. In contrast, a higher share of both MC
and FFS respondents reported having a chronic condition in 2004 versus 1996 or 2000.
The most drastic change was for MC enrollees in moderate-intensity regulation states,
where 25% of people reported a chronic condition in 2000 versus 37% in 2004.
Demographic information was mostly similar across the different regulatory
categories (low/moderate/high-intensity) for 2000 and 2004. However, states with highintensity regulations had a higher proportion of minority and Hispanic people than states
with low- or moderate-intensity regulations. Additionally, a lower proportion of people in
low-regulation intensity states lived in a metropolitan area compared to those in
moderate- and high-intensity states.
Tables 9a-c summarize the dependent variables for each reference group. Table
9a compares information for FFS and MC enrollees in 1996. Tables 9b-c are further
delineated by regulatory intensity (low/moderate/high) for 2000 and 2004, respectively.
Many outcomes showed no significant difference between the two groups. When
significant differences were found, the values were often very similar. Contrary to
research showing dissatisfaction with managed care (Miller & Luft, 2002), 94% of MC
enrollees reported satisfaction with care in 1996 (Table 9a), just below the response of
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Table 9a
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status, 1996 (%)
Managed Care

Fee-for-Service

Doctor has night or weekend hours

55

45†

Patient has no difficulty contacting Doctor
by phone

39

42†

Patient has no difficulty getting an
appointment

43

44

Patient has no difficulty accessing care

90

90

Patient is satisfied with ability to access
care

96

94†

Doctor asks patient if he/she is taking
other treatments

75

79†

Doctor listens to patient

97

97

Patient is confident in Doctor

95

97†

Satisfaction with
Care

Patient is satisfied with care

94

96†

Mortality

Patient did not die during survey year or
year after

99.5

98.4†

Access to Care

73
Confidence in
Providers

†Significant

difference between MC and FFS (p<0.05)

Table 9b
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory
Intensity, 2000 (%)

Low

Access to Care

74
Confidence in
Providers
Satisfaction with
Care

Mortality

‡Significant

Doctor has night or weekend
hours
Patient has no difficulty
contacting Doctor by phone
Patient has no difficulty getting
an appointment
Patient has no difficulty
accessing care
Patient is satisfied with ability
to access care
Doctor asks patient if he/she is
taking other treatments
Doctor listens to patient
Patient is confident in Doctor
Patient is satisfied with care

Patient did not die during
survey year or year after

Managed Care
Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity
ModModHigh
Low
High
erate
erate

49

57

45

38‡

47‡

35‡

46

44

39

44

46

40

46

44

42

44

48

46‡

93

94

91

90‡

88‡

87‡

97

98

95

95‡

93‡

91‡

80

79

82

80

84‡

85‡

98
96

97
96

97
96

97
96

97
97

97
96

97

94

95

96

94

95

Low

Moderate/High

Low

Moderate/
High

99.5

99.7

98.5‡

97.9‡

difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05)

Table 9c
Nationally-representative Mean Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Insurance Status and Regulatory
Intensity, 2004 (%)
Managed Care

Fee-For-Service
Regulatory Intensity

Access to Care

75

Confidence in
Providers

Mortality

‡Significant

Low

Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

High

Doctor has night or weekend
hours

39

55

47

37‡

43‡

34‡

Patient has no difficulty
contacting Doctor by phone

59

59

54

57‡

57

56

Doctor asks patient if he/she
is taking other treatments

75

80

77

77

77‡

77

Patient did not die during
survey year or year after

Low

Moderate/High

Low

Moderate/High

99.3

99.8

98.0‡

98.5‡

difference between MC and FFS in each regulatory category (e.g., MC Low versus FFS Low) (p<0.05)

96% for FFS respondents. Satisfaction rates increased slightly for most MC enrollees
between 1996 and 2000. Also, at least 90% of all respondents reported being satisfied
with their ability to access to care in every reference group in 1996 and 2000. (People
were asked about their “usual source of care,” simplified here and afterwards as
“Doctor”). Likewise, at least 95% of all respondents reported feeling confident in their
Doctor in both 1996 and 2000. Lastly, most respondents reported their Doctor asked
them about other treatments they were taking across all three years.
Despite high satisfaction with care and ability to access to care, most
respondents reported at least some difficulty getting an appointment with their Doctor in
1996 and 2000. In 1996, 43% of MC and 44% of FFS respondents reported difficulty
getting an appointment, while responses ranged between 42-48% for MC and FFS
enrollees in 2000 across different levels of regulatory intensity. Additionally, only 42% of
FFS and 39% of MC enrollees reported no difficulty contacting their Doctor by the
phone in 1996. However, this result improved by 2004, when 54-59% of respondents
across all reference groups reported no difficulty contacting their Doctor by the phone.
Mortality was rare for all groups across the three years, with 98-99% of
respondents living until at least a year after they were in the survey. Due to the very
small number of mortality observations (only a couple of hundred per year), patients in
states with high- and moderate-intensity were combined and compared to low-intensity
regulation states. Managed care patients had a slightly higher likelihood of survival for
all years relative to their FFS counterparts.
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Hypothesis Testing
A difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model is used to estimate
differences in patient outcomes between MC and FFS patients as backlash regulations
were passed. For each period, the DDD model measures the change in outcomes for
managed care patients (relative to FFS patients) in states with low-intensity regulations
relative to patients in states that switched to moderate- and high-intensity (again relative
to FFS patients). Tables 10a-b show regression results for the key independent
variables for 1996-2000 and 2000-2004, respectively. The key variables include the
dummies for managed care, regulatory intensity, post-period, and their interactions. The
regulatory effects are shown as the DDD estimates: MC*Moderate and MC*High for
1996-2000 and MC*Moderate*2004 and MC*High*2004 for 2000-2004 (since all states
are considered low intensity in 1996, the formulas used to estimate the effects are
slightly different; see Formulas 1 & 2 in the Methods Chapter). For clarity, parameter
estimates for the control variables are not shown, but are included in Appendix A.
Main model results.
The first three hypotheses in this study predict MC enrollees in states with more
intense backlash regulations will show greater improvements in access to care,
confidence in provider, and satisfaction relative to MC enrollees in states with less
intense backlash regulations, ceteris paribus. Overall, some support was found in the
second period for the access to care and confidence in provider hypotheses, but results
were negative for access to care in the first period and no support was found for the
patient satisfaction hypothesis. The rest of this chapter describes the regression results
in detail. Explanations for these results are provided in the next chapter.
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Table 10a
Average Marginal Effects and Standard Errors for 1996-2000
Access to Care

Confidence in Provider

Patient has
Doctor has
no difficulty
night or
contacting
weekend
Doctor by
hours
phone

Patient has
no difficulty
accessing
care

0.0013
(0.0161)

-0.0859***
(0.0149)

0.0021
(0.0138)

0.0471***

-0.0282**

(0.0131)
Moderate

Patient is
satisfied
with
ability to
access
care

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

Doctor asks
patient if
he/she is
taking other
treatments

Doctor
listens
to
patient

Patient is
confident in
Doctor

-0.0027
(0.0084)

0.0033
(0.0246)

0.0546***
(0.0146)

0.0067
(0.0067)

-0.0054
(0.0074)

-0.0202***

0.0007

-0.0045

-0.0282***

-0.0034

-0.0168***

(0.0137)

(0.0077)

(0.0064)

(0.0153)

(0.0109)

(0.0047)

(0.0053)

0.0304**

0.1013***

-0.0100

-0.0098

0.0317

0.0013

0.0014

0.0094

High

(0.0158)
-0.0935***
(0.0159)

(0.0168)
0.0850***
(0.0158)

(0.0161)
-0.0239
(0.0170)

(0.0105)
-0.0149
(0.0094)

(0.0312)
0.0262
(0.0275)

(0.0133)
-0.0016
(0.0117)

(0.0073)
0.0027
(0.0077)

(0.0088)
0.0075
(0.0089)

MC *
y2000

-0.0150

-0.0009

0.0350***

0.0228**

0.0266

-0.0290*

0.0059

0.0105

(0.0177)

(0.0178)

(0.0164)

(0.0118)

(0.0313)

(0.0164)

(0.0092)

(0.0096)

MC *
Moderate

0.0097

0.0161

0.0200

0.0179

-0.0547*

0.0246

-0.0088

-0.0012

MC * High

(0.0212)
0.0223
(0.0195)

(0.0205)
-0.0072
(0.0198)

(0.0198)
-0.0037
(0.0207)

(0.0142)
-0.0150
(0.0143)

(0.0334)
-0.0683*
(0.0354)

(0.0173)
0.0166
(0.0168)

(0.0103)
-0.0134
(0.0106)

(0.0127)
-0.0013
(0.0127)

y2000

78

Managed
Care (MC)

(Table 10a continued)
Satisfaction

Mortality

Patient is satisfied with
care

Patient did not die
during the survey
year, or year after

y2000

-0.0056
(0.0081)

y2000

Managed Care (MC)

-0.0167**

MC

(0.0073)
Moderate

79

High
MC * y2000
MC * Moderate
MC * High

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

-0.0176**
(0.0087)
-0.0031
(0.0097)
0.0294**
(0.0131)
-0.0082
(0.0133)
-0.0181
(0.0151)

0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0015)

ModHigh

0.0010
(0.0007)

MC * y2000
MC * ModHigh

-0.0025
(0.0024)
-0.0011
(0.0021)

Table 10b
Average Marginal Effects and Standard Errors for 2000-2004

y2004
MC

80

Moderate (Mod)
High
MC * y2004
MC * Moderate
MC * High
Mod * y2004
High * y2004

Access to Care

Confidence in
Provider

Mortality

Patient has no
Doctor has night difficulty
or weekend
contacting
hours
Doctor by
phone

Doctor asks
patient if he/she is
taking other
treatments

Patient did
not die
during the
survey year,
or year after

-0.0482*
(0.0263)
0.0454***
(0.0133)
0.0443*
(0.0250)
-0.0974***
(0.0215)
-0.0751**
(0.0350)
-0.0157
(0.0277)
0.0024
(0.0260)
0.0127
(0.0393)
0.0455
(0.0352)

0.1378***
(0.0302)
-0.0233*
(0.0136)
0.0341
(0.0233)
-0.0175
(0.0209)
0.0451
(0.0316)
-0.0038
(0.0270)
0.0050
(0.0245)
-0.0245
(0.0397)
0.0198
(0.0366)

-0.0155
(0.0240)
-0.0346***
(0.0114)
0.0550***
(0.0193)
0.0662***
(0.0179)
0.0069
(0.0303)
-0.0272
(0.0206)
-0.0161
(0.0265)
-0.0573*
(0.0316)
-0.0728**
(0.0304)

y2004
MC
ModHigh

MC * y2004
MC * ModHigh

ModHigh * y2004

0.0007
(0.0016)
0.0011
(0.0016)
0.0010
(0.0011)

-0.0046
(0.0035)
-0.0023
(0.0025)

-0.0002
(0.0019)

(Table 10b continued)
Confidence in
Provider

Access to Care
Doctor has
night or
weekend hours
MC * Mod * y2004

0.1077**
(0.0474)

MC * High * y2004

0.1017**
(0.0455)

81
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by phone
-0.0064

Mortality
Patient did
not die during
the survey
year, or year
after

Doctor asks
patient if he/she
is taking other
treatments
0.0809**

(0.0421)

(0.0371)

-0.0594

0.0299

(0.0415)

(0.0418)

MC * ModHigh
* y2004

0.0048
(0.0043)

The following section explains each element of the regression results for a single
outcome, to clarify the meaning of the marginal effect for each variable as they are
presented in the tables. Specifically, the results for “Doctor Asks Patient if He/She is
Taking Other Treatments” for 2000-2004 are explained for each variable in the order
they are presented in Table 10b. After the marginal effects for this specific outcome are
explained, the rest of the chapter summarizes the statistically significant results for the
key independent variables. Specifically, the DDD estimates are presented for both
periods, which show the regulatory effects for each outcome variable, followed by a
summary of the results for the managed care and regulatory intensity dummies.
Confidence in Provider. This section explains the regression results for “Doctor
Asks Patient if He/She is Taking Other Treatments” for 2000-2004 as they are
presented in Table 10b. The results suggest there was no significant difference in the
likelihood of patients reporting their Doctors asked about other treatments they were
taking in 2004 compared to 2000, holding all else equal (marginal effect [ME] = -0.0155,
standard error [SE] = 0.0240; Table 10b). However, significant differences were found
for both the MC dummy and the regulation dummies. On average, people with MC in
the first period reported a 3.46 percentage point lower likelihood of Doctors asking
about other treatments relative to FFS patients. In contrast, people in states with
moderate- and high-intensity regulations were more likely to report Doctors asking
about other treatments in the first period (by 5.50 and 6.62 percentage points,
respectively). The interaction of MC with 2004 was statistically insignificant, as were the
interactions of MC with the regulation dummies. The latter finding means MC enrollees
in states with different regulatory intensities did not report differences in confidence in
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provider in the first period, on average. People in moderate- and high-intensity
regulation states in 2004 were less likely to report a Doctor asked about other
treatments they were taking (-5.73 percentage points and -7.28 percentage points,
respectively).
The DDD estimates are the final two parameters in Table 10b. Significant effects
were found for moderate-intensity regulation states, but not for high-intensity states.
Specifically, MC patients in states that moved from low-intensity regulations to
moderate-intensity between 2000 and 2004 were more likely to report their Doctor
asked them about other treatments there were taking by 8.09 percentage points,
controlling for changes in FFS patients. No regulatory effects were found for highintensity states. These results are discussed in the next chapter.
The next three sections summarize the results for the main variables of interest
across all outcomes and time periods. The regulatory effects (DDD estimates) are first
summarized, followed by the individual estimates on the managed care and regulatory
intensity dummies. Unlike the previous section which discussed results for a single
outcome, these sections summarize results across outcomes for each key independent
variable. This allows for a more comprehensive comparison of results across all
outcomes. To keep the presentation of results concise, only the statistically significant
results are mentioned.
Regulatory Effect. This section describes the regulatory effects on MC patients
when moving from low- to moderate- or high-intensity regulations, as represented by the
DDD estimates (MC*Mod and MC*High for 1996-2000; MC*Mod*2004 and
MC*High*2004 for 2000-2004). Significant results were negative in the first period for
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access to care, but were positive in the second period for access to care and
confidence in provider. For access to care in the first period, the probability of MC
enrollees reporting no difficulty making an appointment was 5.47 percentage points less
in states that moved from low- to moderate-intensity regulations and 6.83 percentage
points less when states went from low- to high-intensity (Table 10a). However, in the
second period, MC enrollees in states that went from low-intensity to moderate- or highintensity were more likely to report their Doctor was accessible on nights and weekends
(10.77 and 10.17 percentage points, respectively; Table 10b). Also in the second
period, MC enrollees in states that went from low intensity to moderate were 8.09
percentage points more likely to report their Doctor asked them about other treatments
(Table 10b). Results did not indicate any regulatory effect on patient satisfaction, which
was only available for the first period. Regulatory effects were also not found for the
mortality outcome, as expected.
These results show states with a moderate-intensity regulatory backlash saw
positive results for MC enrollees in the second period for both access to care and
confidence in provider. However, the only significant regulatory effect in the first period
was negative and showed MC enrollees reported relatively worse access to care in
states that enacted moderate- and high-intensity regulations.
Managed Care. This section describes the managed care dummy estimates (MC
and MC*2000 for 1996-2000; MC, MC*2004, MC*Mod, and MC*High for 2000-2004).
Results showed outcomes for MC enrollees, in general, were mostly negative relative to
FFS enrollees. The only positive result was found in a single access to care variable—
MC enrollees were significantly more likely to have access to Doctors on nights or
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weekends (ME = 0.0471; Table 10a; ME=0.0454; Table 10b). However, they were less
likely to report no difficulty contacting the Doctor by phone in both periods (ME = 0.0282; Table 10a; ME=0.0233; Table 10b) and less likely to report no difficulty
accessing care in the first period (ME = -0.0202; Table 10a).
The significant confidence and satisfaction outcomes for MC enrollees were all
negative. MC enrollees were less likely to report Doctors asked about other treatments
they were taking by 2.82 percentage points in the first period (Table 10a) and by 3.46
percentage points in the second period (Table 10b). Additionally, MC enrollees reported
less confidence in provider in the first period (ME = -0.0168; Table 10a) and less
satisfaction with care (ME = -0.0167; Table 10a). These last two questions were only
available in the first period.
Mixed results were found for the MC interactions. In the first period (MC*2000),
results were positive for access and satisfaction, but negative for confidence.
Specifically, MC enrollees in 2000 were more likely to report having no difficulty
accessing care (ME = 0.0350; Table 10a), being satisfied with ability to access to care,
(ME = 0.0228), and being satisfied with care (ME = 0.0294). However, they were less
likely to report that Doctors asked if they were taking other treatments (ME = -0.0290;
Table 10a). In the second period (MC*2004), the only significant effect was negative for
access to care. Specifically, MC enrollees in 2004 were less likely to report their Doctor
had night or weekend hours (ME = -0.0751; Table 10b). No significant effects were
found for the interaction of MC with the regulatory intensity dummies (MC*Mod and
MC*High) for any of the outcomes for 2000-2004.
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To summarize, the results suggest MC enrollees, on average, reported relatively
worse confidence in provider and satisfaction than people with FFS insurance. Both
positive and negative results were found for access to care. However, the interactions
suggest access to care and satisfaction improved between 1996 and 2000 for MC
enrollees. There is no indication of average improvements for MC enrollees during the
second period, 2000-2004.
Regulations. This section describes the remaining regulatory intensity dummy
estimates (Moderate and High for 1996-2000; Moderate, High, Mod*2004, and
High*2004 for 2000-2004). Results showed mostly positive outcomes for the regulation
intensity variables. All significant access and confidence variables for moderateintensity states were positive for both periods. Specifically, people in moderate-intensity
states in the first period were more likely to report their Doctor had night or weekend
hours and to report having no difficulty contacting their Doctor by phone (ME = 0.0304
and 0.1013, respectively; Table 10a). In the second period, they were again more likely
to report their Doctor had night or weekend hours and to report their Doctor asked them
about other treatments they were taking (ME = 0.0443 and 0.0550, respectively; Table
10b). The only negative parameter for moderate-intensity states was in the first period,
when people in those states were less likely to report being satisfied with care (ME = 0.0176; Table 10a).
Results for the high-intensity regulation dummies were mixed for access to care
and positive for confidence in provider. People in these states were less likely to report
their Doctor had night or weekend hours in both periods (ME = -0.0935; Table 10a; and
ME = -0.0974; Table 10b). But they were more likely to report having no difficulty
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contacting their Doctor by phone in the first period (ME = 0.0850; Table 10a) and that
their Doctor asked them about other treatments they were taking (ME = 0.0662; Table
10b).
To summarize, the results suggest people in states with moderate-intensity
regulations enrollees, on average, reported relatively better access to care and
confidence in provider than people in low-intensity regulation states. People in highintensity regulation states also reported relatively greater confidence in provider, but
results were mixed for access to care.
Additional analysis.
A base model was estimated that only included the key independent variables to
test the model specification. As expected, the base model parameters (Appendix B)
were generally consistent with those in the fully-specified model, except for mortality.
The mortality variable in the baseline model showed positive, statistically significant
results for MC patients in moderate/high-intensity regulation states (relative likelihood of
being alive in the survey year or year after was estimated to be 0.94 percentage points;
Appendix Table 2c). However, these results were not significant in the fully-specified
model when relevant control variables were included, such as old age and self-reported
poor health.
Summary
Results indicate states with a moderate-intensity regulatory backlash saw
positive results for MC enrollees for both access to care and confidence in provider in
the second period. However, MC enrollees reported relatively worse access to care in
states that enacted moderate- and high-intensity regulations in the first period. No
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significant regulatory effects were found for satisfaction with care or mortality. The
results also showed MC enrollees, on average, reported relatively worse confidence in
provider and satisfaction than people with FFS insurance. However, access to care and
satisfaction with care appeared to improve between 1996 and 2000 for MC enrollees,
on average (but not between 2000 and 2004). Finally, results find people in states with
moderate- and high-intensity regulations, on average, reported relatively better
confidence in provider than people in low-intensity regulation states and people in
moderate-intensity regulations states also reported improvements in access to care.
The next chapter includes a detailed discussion of these results in context of the
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework chapters. Policy implications and future
research are also discussed.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion

Hundreds of state laws were passed during the managed care backlash of the
late 1990s and early 2000s. The backlash reflected negative public sentiment arising
from the widespread belief that access to services and quality of care was suffering due
to the cost-driven decisions of MCOs (Goldberg, 1999). The intent of many backlash
regulations was to force MCOs to operate more like traditional FFS insurance. Many of
the regulations eased or eliminated constraints on utilization that prevented patient
access to care. Several regulations gave providers more flexibility in the way they
practiced care. Other laws helped patients appeal denials of service. Whether the
backlash regulations translated to better outcomes for MC enrollees is examined in this
study. The results indicate the regulations did improve outcomes for MC enrollees, but
to a varying degree and only in the latter period of the backlash. Specifically, MC
enrollees who lived in states that adopted moderate-intensity regulations between 2000
and 2004 reported relatively better improvements in access to care and confidence in
provider relative to MC enrollees in low-intensity regulations states. Similar positive
effects for access to care were found for MC enrollees in states that adopted highintensity regulations. Conversely, access to care was found to be relatively worse for
MC enrollees in states that adopted moderate- or high-intensity backlash regulations
between 1996 and 2000. And no evidence was found to support backlash regulations
had a positive effect on patient satisfaction with care. This chapter offers a few
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explanations for these outcomes. Possible implications for health care policy and
management are also provided, along with suggestions for future research.
Between 2000 and 2004, MC enrollees in states that enacted moderate-intensity
regulations reported their Doctor asked about other treatments they were taking at
higher rates than enrollees in states that remained with low-intensity regulations. This
suggests after the passage of moderate-intensity backlash regulations, Doctors were
engaging more with their patients, indicative of a trust-based relationship. During the
managed care backlash, MCOs were characterized as disrupting the patient-doctor
relationship by interfering with provider treatment decisions (Baker & McClellan, 2001).
Many of the regulations attempted to address the issue of MCO influence over provider
and patient choices by allowing Doctors to fully engage with patients, such as by
discussing all their treatment options. All but two states passed regulations banning
physician gag orders that prevented providers from discussing treatments with patients
if the MCO did not cover it. And 31 states banned MCOs from providing financial
incentives to providers for restricting patient utilization of services. States with
moderate-intensity regulations had a combination of these types of laws. The positive
impact on confidence in provider in the second period suggests providers did respond to
the moderate-intensity backlash regulations by involving patients more in the decisionmaking process.
Results also show no accompanying improvement in confidence in provider was
found in high-intensity regulation states. Many high-intensity states passed one or more
of every type of regulation. Therefore, high-intensity states generally had the same
regulations as moderate-intensity states, just more of them. This means there were also

90

more likely to pass rarer regulations, such as ombudsman programs and liability
regulations. The lack of effect on confidence in provider for enrollees in high-intensity
states, but not moderate-intensity states, may indicate the additional regulations were
counterproductive. High-intensity regulation states often passed dozens of laws over
multiple years. Providers may have resented the excessive regulation of care and not
responded, even if the intent of the laws was to improve patient outcomes. One study
found increasing rates of regulation limited provider communication with patients
because providers believe their comments could be used against them in malpractice
lawsuits (Hamasaki, Takehara, & Hagihara, 2008). Additionally, providers may not
respond to regulations if they perceive them as having paternalistic motivations
(Monahan, 2012), such as HMO report card requirements, which insinuate managed
care providers were offering sub-standard care to their patients.
Mixed regulatory effects on access to care across the two periods may reflect an
increase in demand for services due to the regulations. Provider flexibility laws had the
potential to increase demand for procedures, specifically, the bans on gag orders and
financial incentives for providers. Managed care enrollees in states that moved from
low-intensity regulations to moderate- or high-intensity between 1996 and 2000 reported
relatively more difficulty making an appointment with their Doctor, controlling for
changes in FFS patients. This could reflect providers not meeting the increased demand
for services, resulting in a bottleneck for MC enrollees seeking to access care. Likewise,
between 2000 and 2004, MC enrollees in states that moved from low-intensity
regulations to moderate- or high- intensity were more likely to report having access to
Doctors on night or weekend hours. This could also reflect the additional demand for
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services resulted in providers offering additional hours. In both cases, the regulatory
effect on access to care is indirect, as none of the regulations directly address ease of
getting an appointment or PCPs providing additional business hours.
No significant regulatory effect was found for satisfaction with care. If the
backlash was driven in part from patient dissatisfaction with utilization constraints and
MCO interference (Rodwin, 1996), the expectation was satisfaction for MC enrollees in
states with more intense regulations would improve once those issues were resolved.
The lack of effect from regulations may partly be explained by the already high
satisfaction rates for managed care enrollees, as shown in the summary statistics in the
Results chapter. Additionally, reports of dissatisfaction may have been overblown or
misinterpreted. In Blendon et al. (1998), HMO enrollees were found to be satisfied with
care at the same rate as FFS enrollees. Likewise, in the first review by Miller and Luft
(1997), four out of five papers found MCO enrollees reported less satisfaction than their
FFS counterparts, though results were significant in only one of those papers. It is also
possible satisfaction did increase because of the regulations, but only in the second
period, when the variable was unavailable. This corresponds with the finding that
confidence in provider only improved in the second period for managed care enrollees
in moderate-intensity states.
Health Care Policy and Management Implications
Much of the uptick in overall health care spending in the early 2000s is attributed
to the backlash regulations (Pinkovskiy, 2014). This study indicates moderate-intensity
regulations resulted in benefits to MC enrollees by way of increased access to care and
confidence in provider in the second half of the backlash, suggesting a potential
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justification for the increase in spending over the period. Additionally, a spillover effect
from the regulations may have occurred for FFS enrollees. This analysis shows some
outcomes were higher for all patients in both periods in states with moderate-intensity
regulations, not just MC enrollees. Research has found providers who treat a high
proportion of MC patients end up treating their FFS patients more like MC patients
compared to providers who treat only FFS patients (Glied & Zivin, 2002). If providers
generally felt more freedom to discuss treatment options with patients after regulations
were adopted that banned gag orders and financial incentives, this may have resulted in
better outcomes for all their patients.
These results also point out the importance of distinguishing between different
levels of intensity when discussing the backlash regulations. Managed care enrollees in
states with moderate-intensity regulations were found to have relatively better access to
care and confidence in provider in the second half of the backlash. The results also
show MC enrollees in states with high-intensity regulations did not report increases in
confidence in provider in the second period like they did in moderate-intensity regulation
states. And the positive effect for high-intensity access to care in 2004 was almost the
same as for moderate-intensity states. This indicates that more regulations did not
translate into better outcomes, instead it was the mix of regulations that mattered.
Positive results only in the latter part of the backlash coincide with a prediction by Noble
and Brennan (1999) that managed care backlash regulations would become more
nuanced, and more impactive, as the years went on as legislators learned how to write
more effective laws using earlier regulations as a guide.
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The managed care backlash was precipitated by widespread patient and provider
dissatisfaction with care (Baker & McClellan, 2001). However, the results of this study
indicate satisfaction with care and ability to access care was already very high for both
MC and FFS enrollees during the backlash. In 1996, over 95% of MC and FFS
respondents said they were satisfied with their care and over 90% said they had no
difficulty accessing care and were satisfied with their ability to access care (Table 9a).
Likewise, over 95% of all patients said they were confident in their doctor and that their
doctor listened to them. Despite high marks for these generalize questions, more
pointed questions about access to care and confidence in provider suggest issues exist
beneath the surface. Less than half of all respondents in 1996 reported no difficulty
accessing providers on nights and weekends or having no difficulty contacting providers
by phone (Table 9a). Policymakers have begun using PROs as part of value-based
reimbursement arrangements, such as Accountable Care Organizations that pay
doctors or hospitals to meet certain cost and quality benchmarks, including high scores
on certain aspects of satisfaction with care and access to care (Highfill & Ozcan, 2016).
These types of delivery models may consider using specific questions about aspects of
quality over the more generalized questions that tend to always skew positive.
Suggestions for Future Research
This study helps inform the scant research on the impact on patient outcomes
from the hundreds of states managed care backlash regulations passed between 19962004. The results of this analysis find the regulations did improve access to care and
confidence in providers for MC patients in the second half of the backlash. This is the
same period Pinkovskiy (2014) attributes increases in health care spending to the
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backlash regulations. Future research may pursue a genuine cost-benefit analysis by
combining patient outcomes and health care spending into a single study to determine a
monetary value of the regulatory benefits. Additionally, a different data source besides
MEPS, one that is not constrained by confidentiality rules, is desirable for future
research that requires state-level analysis. Since this study was only permitted to test
one version of state intensity categories, a robustness check could not be performed to
see what impact, if any, resulted from giving rarer regulations more weight and
contributed to states being categorized as high-intensity. This is potentially significant
considering high-intensity regulation states were not found to have the same positive
effect as moderate-intensity states.
Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of state
regulations on patient-reported quality of care and mortality for managed care enrollees.
The stated goal of the backlash regulations was to ensure patients received good
quality of care (Zelman, 1999). The results of this analysis show the managed care
backlash regulations had the intended effect of improving access to care and
confidence in provider for MC enrollees states that adopted moderate-intensity
regulations in the second half of the backlash. The positive effect on access to care was
similar in states that adopted high-intensity regulations. However, no positive effect was
found in the first period for any outcome. These results show that states with the most
intense backlash did not realize better patient outcomes, instead, outcomes were most
impacted by the composition of regulations in each state.

95

References

Adler, Loren, and Paul B. Ginsburg. Obamacare premiums are lower than you think.
Health Affairs, July 21 (2016).
Aizer, A., Currie, J., & Moretti, E. (2007). Does managed care hurt health? evidence
from Medicaid mothers. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3), 385-399.
doi:10.1162/rest.89.3.385
Backus, L. I., & Bindman, A. B. (2001). Low- income Californians’ experiences with
health insurance and managed care. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and
Underserved, 12(4), 446-460.
Baker, L. C., & McClellan, M. B. (2001). Managed care, health care quality, and
regulation. The Journal of Legal Studies, 30, 715-741. doi:10.1086/339299
Baldwin, A. (2001). Wagging the dog: An analysis of year 2000 workforce and
education outcomes from recommendations of the 1995 pew commission report.
Journal of Allied Health, 30(3), 160.
Balla, S. J. (1999). Markets, governments, and HMO development in the 1990s
doi:10.1215/03616878-24-2-215
Balla, S. J. (2001). Interstate professional associations and the diffusion of policy
innovations. American Politics Research, 29(3), 221-245.
doi:10.1177/1532673X01293001

96

Barry, C. L., & Ridgely, M. S. (2008). Mental health and substance abuse insurance
parity for federal employees: How did health plans respond? Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 27(1), 155-170. doi:10.1002/pam.20311
Beach, M. C., Meredith, L. S., Halpern, J., Wells, K. B., & Ford, D. E. (2005). Physician
conceptions of responsibility to individual patients and distributive justice in
health care. Annals of Family Medicine, 3(1), 53.
Beckles, L. A., G., Williamson, F., D., Brown, F., A., Gregg, W., E., Karter, J., A., Kim,
A., Catherine, Thompson, J., T. (2007). Agreement between self-reports and
medical records was only fair in a cross-sectional study of performance of annual
eye examinations among adults with diabetes in managed care. Medical Care,
45(9), 876-883. doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3180ca95fa
Bender, R., & Garfinkel, S. (2001). Differences in the structure of CAHPS measures
among the Medicare fee-for- service, Medicare managed care, and privately
insured populations. Health Services Research, 36(3), 489-508.
Berman, S., Armon, C., & Todd, J. (2005). Impact of a decline in Colorado Medicaid
managed care enrollment on access and quality of preventive primary care
services. Pediatrics, 116(6), 1474.
Bernard, D. B., & Shulkin, D. J. (1998). The media vs managed health care: Are we
seeing a full court press? Archives of Internal Medicine, 158(19), 2109.
Bian, J., Dow, W. H., & Matchar, D. B. (2006). Medicare HMO penetration and mortality
outcomes of ischemic stroke. The American Journal of Managed Care, 12(1), 58.
Blanc, P. D., Trupin, L., Earnest, G., San Pedro, M., Katz, P. P., Yelin, E. H., & Eisner,
M. D. (2003). Effects of physician- related factors on adult asthma care, health

97

status, and quality of life. The American Journal of Medicine, 114(7), 581-587.
doi:10.1016/S0002-9343(03)00053-6
Blendon, R., Brodie, M., Benson, J., & Altman, D. (1998). Understanding the managed
care backlash. Health Affairs, 17(4), 80-94.
Bloom, J. R., Hu, T., Wallace, N., Cuffel, B., Hausman, J. W., Sheu, M., & Scheffler, R.
(2002). Mental health costs and access under alternative capitation systems in
Colorado. Health Services Research, 37(2), 315-340. doi:10.1111/14756773.025
Bodenheimer, T. (2005). High and rising health care costs. part 2: Technologic
innovation. Annals of Internal Medicine, 142(11), 932.
Bolin, J. N., Buchanan, R. J., & Smith, S. R. (2002). State regulation of private health
insurance: Prescription drug benefits, experimental treatments, and consumer
protection. The American Journal of Managed Care, 8(11), 977-985. doi:152 [pii]
Born, P., & Query, J. (2004). Health maintenance organization ( HMO) performance
and consumer complaints: An empirical study of frustrating HMO activities.
Hospital Topics, 82(1), 2-9. doi:10.3200/HTPS.82.1.2-9
Brodie, M., Brady, L. A., & Altman, D. E. (1998). Media coverage of managed care: Is
there a negative bias? Health Affairs (Project Hope), 17(1), 9-25.
Brown, V. Y., & Hartung, B. R. (1998). Managed care at the crossroads: Can managed
care organizations survive government regulation? Annals of Health Law / Loyola
University Chicago, School of Law, Institute for Health Law, 7, 25.
Buntin, M. B., Garber, A. M., McClellan, M. B., & Newhouse, J. P. (2004). The costs of
decedents in the Medicare program.

98

Callahan, M., Fein, O., & Battleman, D. (2002). A practice- profiling system for
residents. Academic Medicine, 77(1), 34-39.
Cella, D., Riley, W., Stone, A., Rothrock, N., Reeve, B., Yount, S., Choi, S. (2010). The
patient-reported outcomes measurement information system (PROMIS)
developed and tested its first wave of adult self-reported health outcome item
banks: 2005–2008. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 63(11), 1179-1194.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2012). National health expenditure data.
Historical Tables Available at
Http://www.Cms.Hhs.gov/NationalhealthexpendData/downloads/tables.Pdf,
Chan, L., Hart, L. G., & Goodman, D. C. (2006). Geographic access to health care for
rural Medicare beneficiaries. The Journal of Rural Health, 22(2), 140-146.
Chen, J., H., Bazzoli, W., G., Harless, P., D., & Clement, P., J. (2010). Is quality of
cardiac hospital care a public or private good? Medical Care, 48(11), 999-1006.
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181eafa0d
Connor, K. I., Mcneese‐smith, D. K., Vickrey, B. G., Van Servellen, G. M., Chang, B. L.,
Lee, M. L., Chodosh, J. (2008). Determining care management activities
associated with mastery and relationship strain for dementia caregivers. Journal
of the American Geriatrics Society, 56(5), 891-897. doi:10.1111/j.15325415.2008.01643.x
Cooper, P., & Green, K. (1991). The impact of state laws on managed care. Health
Affairs (Project Hope), 10(4), 161-169.

99

Cooper, F., P., Simon, I., K., & Vistnes, I., J. (2006). A closer look at the managed care
backlash. Medical Care, 44(5), I-4-I-11.
doi:10.1097/01.mlr.0000208155.10817.6d
Cromwell, J., Trisolini, M. G., Pope, G. C., Mitchell, J. B., & Greenwald, L. M. (2011).
Pay for performance in health care: Methods and approaches RTI Press.
Daley, M. (2005). Race, managed care, and the quality of substance abuse treatment.
Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services
Research, 32(4), 457-476. doi:10.1007/s10488-004-1670-3
Davidoff, A., Hill, I., Courtot, B., & Adams, E. (2007). Effects of managed care on
service use and access for publicly insured children with chronic health
conditions. Pediatrics, 119(5), 956.
Donabedian, A. (1980). Explorations in quality assessment and monitoring.
Donabedian, A. (1988). The quality of care: How can it be assessed? Jama, 260(12),
1743-1748.
Dugan, J. (2015). Trends in managed care cost containment: An analysis of the
managed care backlash. Health Economics, 24(12), 1604-1618.
Dwyer, D., Liu, H., & Rizzo, J. A. (2012). Does patient trust promote better care?
Applied Economics, 44(18), 2283-2295. doi:10.1080/00036846.2011.564139
Emanuel, E. J. (2012). Why accountable care organizations are not 1990s managed
care redux. Jama, 307(21), 2263-2264.
Emanuel, E. J., & Fuchs, V. R. (2008). The perfect storm of overutilization. Jama,
299(23), 2789. doi:10.1001/jama.299.23.2789

100

Enthoven, A. C., Schauffler, H. H., & McMenamin, S. (2001). Consumer choice and the
managed care backlash. American Journal of Law & Medicine, 27(1), 1.
Ettner, S. L., Thompson, T. J., Stevens, M. R., Mangione, C. M., Kim, C., Neil Steers,
W., Venkat Narayan, K. M. (2006). Are physician reimbursement strategies
associated with processes of care and patient satisfaction for patients with
diabetes in managed care? Health Services Research, 41(4), 1221-1241.
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00533.x
Fang, H., Liu, H., & Rizzo, J. (2009). Has the use of physician gatekeepers declined
among HMOs? evidence from the united states. International Journal of Health
Care Finance and Economics, 9(2), 183-195. doi:10.1007/s10754-009-9060-8
Felt-Lisk, S., & Mays, G. (2002). Back to the drawing board: New directions in health
plans' care management strategies. Health Affairs, 21(5), 210-7.
Fenton, J. J., Jerant, A. F., Bertakis, K. D., & Franks, P. (2012). The cost of
satisfaction: A national study of patient satisfaction, health care utilization,
expenditures, and mortality. Archives of Internal Medicine, 172(5), 405-411.
Fournier, G. M., & McInnes, M. M. (2002). The effects of managed care on medical
referrals and the quality of specialty care. Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(4),
457-473. doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00186
Fox, H. B., McManus, M. A., & Limb, S. J. (2003). Early assessments of SCHIP’s effect
on access to care for adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health, 32(6), 40-52.
doi:10.1016/S1054-139X(03)00068-5

101

Frankel, R. M., & Hourigan, N. T. (2004). Thirty-five voices in search of an author:
What focus groups reveal about patients experiences in managed care settings.
Communication & Medicine, 1(1), 45-58. doi:10.1515/come.2004.005 [doi]
Garrett, B., & Zuckerman, S. (2005). National estimates of the effects of mandatory
Medicaid managed care programs on health care access and use, 1997–1999.
Medical Care, 43(7), 649-657. doi:10.1097/01.mlr.0000167105.75204.71
Garwood, C. L., Dumo, P., Baringhaus, S. N., & Laban, K. M. (2008). Quality of
anticoagulation care in patients discharged from a pharmacist- managed
anticoagulation clinic after stabilization of warfarin therapy. Pharmacotherapy,
28(1), 20.
Gawande, A. A., Blendon, R., Brodie, M., Benson, J. M., Levitt, L., & Hugick, L. (1998).
Does dissatisfaction with health plans stem from having no choices? Health
Affairs (Project Hope), 17(5), 184.
Ghose, T. (2008). Organizational- and individual- level correlates of posttreatment
substance use: A multilevel analysis. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment,
34(2), 249-262. doi:10.1016/j.jsat.2007.04.007
Glickman, S. W., Boulding, W., Manary, M., Staelin, R., Roe, M. T., Wolosin, R. J., . . .
Schulman, K. A. (2010). Patient satisfaction and its relationship with clinical
quality and inpatient mortality in acute myocardial infarction.
Circulation.Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes, 3(2), 188-195.
doi:10.1161/CIRCOUTCOMES.109.900597 [doi]

102

Glied, S., & Zivin, J. G. (2002). How do doctors behave when some (but not all) of their
patients are in managed care? Journal of Health Economics, 21(2), 337-353.
doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00131-X
Goetghebeur, M. M., Forrest, S., & Hay, J. W. (2003). Understanding the underlying
drivers of inpatient cost growth: A literature review. Am J Manag Care, 9(Spec
No 1), SP3-SP12.
Goldberg, M. A. (1999). Two backlashes: Targeted reforms and supply chain
management. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 24(5), 1001-1003.
Gotay, C. C., Kawamoto, C. T., Bottomley, A., & Efficace, F. (2008). The prognostic
significance of patient-reported outcomes in cancer clinical trials. Journal of
Clinical Oncology : Official Journal of the American Society of Clinical Oncology,
26(8), 1355-1363. doi:10.1200/JCO.2007.13.3439 [doi]
Gowrisankaran, G., & Town, R. J. (2003). Competition, payers, and hospital quality 1.
Health Services Research, 38(6), 1403-1422. doi:10.1111/j.14756773.2003.00185.x
Gray, V., Lowery, D., & Godwin, E. K. (2007). The political management of managed
care: Explaining variations in state health maintenance organization regulations.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 32(3), 457-495. doi:32/3/457
Grembowski, D. E., Patrick, D. L., Williams, B., Diehr, P., & Martin, D. P. (2005).
Managed care and patient-rated quality of care from primary physicians. Medical
Care Research and Review : MCRR, 62(1), 31-55. doi:62/1/31 [pii]
Grembowski, D., Paschane, D., Diehr, P., Katon, W., Martin, D., & Patrick, D. L. (2007).
Managed care and patient ratings of the quality of specialty care among patients

103

with pain or depressive symptoms. BMC Health Services Research, 7, 22-22.
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-7-22
Grumbach, K., Osmond, D., Vranizan, K., Jaffe, D., & Bindman, A. B. (1998). Primary
care physicians' experience of financial incentives in managed-care systems.
New England Journal of Medicine, 339(21), 1516-1521.
Haile, P. A., & Stein, R. M. (2002). Managed care incentives and inpatient
complications. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 11(1), 37-79.
doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00037.x
Hall, M. A. (2004). Managed care patient protection or provider protection? A
qualitative assessment. The American Journal of Medicine, 117(12), 932-937.
doi:10.1016/j.amjmed.2004.06.042
Hamasaki, T., Takehara, T., & Hagihara, A. (2008). Physicians' communication skills
with patients and legal liability in decided medical malpractice litigation cases in
japan. BMC Family Practice, 9(1), 43.
Hargraves, J. L., & Pham, H. H. (2003). Back in the driver's seat: Specialists regaining
autonomy Center for Studying Health System Change.
Hazelhurst, B., McBurnie, M. A., Mularski, R. A., Puro, J. E., & Chauvie, S. L. (2012).
Automating care quality measurement with health information technology. The
American Journal of Managed Care, 18(6), 313.
Hearld, L. R., Alexander, J. A., Fraser, I., & Jiang, H. J. (2008). Review: How do
hospital organizational structure and processes affect quality of care?: A critical
review of research methods. Medical Care Research and Review : MCRR, 65(3),
259.

104

Hewner, S., Wu, Y. B., & Castner, J. (2016). Comparative effectiveness of riskstratified care management in reducing readmissions in Medicaid adults with
chronic disease. Journal for Healthcare Quality : Official Publication of the
National Association for Healthcare Quality, 38(1), 3.
doi:10.1097/01.JHQ.0000479826.80326.2e
Highfill, T., & Ozcan, Y. (2016). Productivity and quality of hospitals that joined the
Medicare Shared Savings Accountable Care Organization Program. International
Journal of Healthcare Management.
Hirth, R. A., Grazier, K. L., Chernew, M. E., & Okeke, E. N. (2007). Insurers'
competitive strategy and enrollment in newly offered preferred provider
organizations (PPOs). Inquiry, 44(4), 400-411.
Huesch, M. D. (2009). Can managed care plans reliably infer the quality of cardiac
surgeons' outcomes? The American Journal of Managed Care, 15(12), 890.
Hurley, R. E., & Draper, D. A. (2002). Health plan responses to managed care
regulation. Managed Care Quarterly, 10(4), 30-42.
Institute of Medicine (US). Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. (2001).
Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century National
Academy Press.
Jiang, H., Friedman, B., & Jiang, S. (2013). Hospital cost and quality performance in
relation to market forces: An examination of U.S. community hospitals in the
“post-managed care era”. International Journal of Health Care Finance and
Economics, 13(1), 53-71. doi:10.1007/s10754-013-9122-9

105

Kahana, E., Dan, A., Kahana, B., Kercher, K., Seçkin, G., Stange, K., & Kronenfeld, J.
(2004). Changing health care experiences and perspectives of older adults:
Comparison of HMO and fee-for-service enrollees. Chronic care, health care
systems and services integration (pp. 65-80) Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2002). Health Care Marketplace Project: Trends and
Indicators in the changing health care marketplace. Accessed May 10, 2015 at
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2002/04/marketplace2002_fin
alcuuuuu.pdf.
Kane, R. (2006). Understanding health care outcomes research (Second Edition ed.).
Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2006.
Kane, R. L., Flood, S., Bershadsky, B., & Keckhafer, G. (2004). Effect of an innovative
Medicare managed care program on the quality of care for nursing home
residents. The Gerontologist, 44(1), 95.
Kane, R. L., Homyak, P., Bershadsky, B., Lum, T., Flood, S., & Zhang, H. (2005). The
quality of care under a managed- care program for dual eligibles. The
Gerontologist, 45(4), 496.
Kapoor, J. R., Kapoor, R., Hellkamp, A. S., Hernandez, A. F., Heidenreich, P. A., &
Fonarow, G. C. (2011). Payment source, quality of care, and outcomes in
patients hospitalized with heart failure. Journal of the American College of
Cardiology, 58(14), 1465-1471. doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2011.06.034
Kaye, H. S., & Harrington, C. (2015). Long- term services and supports in the
community: Toward a research agenda. Disability and Health Journal, 8(1), 3-8.
doi:10.1016/j.dhjo.2014.09.003

106

Kemper, P., Tu, H. T., Reschovsky, J. D., & Schaefer, E. (2002). Insurance product
design and its effects: Trade- offs along the managed care continuum. Inquiry,
39(2), 101-117.
Kerr, E. A., Gerzoff, R. B., Krein, S. L., Selby, J. V., Piette, J. D., Curb, J. D., Mangione,
C. M. (2004). Diabetes care quality in the veterans affairs health care system and
commercial managed care: The TRIAD study. Annals of Internal Medicine,
141(4), 272.
Keyes, K. B., Wickizer, T. M., & Franklin, G. (2001). Two-year health and employment
outcomes among injured workers enrolled in the Washington state managed care
pilot project. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 40(6), 619.
Kim, C., Steers, W., Herman, W., Mangione, C., Narayan, K., & Ettner, S. (2007).
Physician compensation from salary and quality of diabetes care. Journal of
General Internal Medicine, 22(4), 448-452. doi:10.1007/s11606-007-0124-5
Ko, Y., & Coons, S. J. (2005). pihi0 an examination of self- reported chronic conditions
and health status in the 2001 Medicare health outcomes survey
doi:10.1016/S1098-3015(10)62770-2
Konetzka, R. T., Zhu, J., Sochalski, J., & Volpp, K. G. (2008). Managed care and
hospital cost containment. Inquiry, 45(1), 98-111.
Kronebusch, K., Schlesinger, M., & Thomas, T. (2009). Managed care regulation in the
states: The impact on physicians' practices and clinical autonomy
doi:10.1215/03616878-2008-045
Kyes, B., K., Wickizer, M., T., & Franklin, M., G. (2003). Employer satisfaction with
workers’ compensation health care: Results of the Washington state workers’

107

compensation managed care pilot. Journal of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine, 45(3), 234-240. doi:10.1097/01.jom.0000058337.05741.a1
Laditka, S., & Laditka, J. (2000). Utilization, costs, and access to primary care in feefor- service and managed care plans. Journal of Health & Social Policy, 13(1),
21-39. doi:10.1300/J045v13n01_02
Landon, B. E., Aseltine Jr, R., Shaul, J. A., Miller, Y., Auerbach, B. A., & Cleary, P. D.
(2002). Evolving dissatisfaction among primary care physicians. Am J Manag
Care, 8(10), 890-901.
Latham, S. R. (1996). Regulation of managed care incentive payments to physicians.
Am.JL & Med., 22, 399.
Laugesen, M. J., Paul, R. R., Luft, H. S., Aubry, W., & Ganiats, T. G. (2006). A
comparative analysis of mandated benefit laws, 1949– 2002. Health Services
Research, 41(3), 1081-1103. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00521.x
Lichtenberg, F. R. (2013). The effect of pharmaceutical innovation on longevity: Patient
level evidence from the 1996–2002 medical expenditure panel survey and linked
mortality public-use files. Forum for Health Economics and Policy, , 16(1) 1-33.
Lòpez-de, F. A., Hardin, J. W., Smith, K. L. M., Liu, Q., Payne, T., Stewart, J. E., &
Brantley, V. (2010). Associations between mental health and diabetes: Findings
from the South Carolina Medicaid managed care program in 2006- 2008.
Ethnicity & Disease, 20(3), 239.
Luft, H. S. (2003). Variations in patterns of care and outcomes after acute myocardial
infarction for Medicare beneficiaries in Fee‐for‐ service and HMO settings. Health
Services Research, 38(4), 1065-1079. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.00163

108

Lum, D. (1975). The health maintenance organization delivery system. A national study
of attitudes of HMO project directors on HMO issues. American Journal of Public
Health, 65(11), 1192.
Ly, D. P., Lopez, L., Isaac, T., & Jha, A. K. (2010). How do black-serving hospitals
perform on patient safety indicators? implications for national public reporting and
pay-for-performance. Medical Care, 48(12), 1133.
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181f81c7e
Ma, E., Coleman, E. A., Fish, R., Lin, M., & Kramer, A. M. (2004). Quantifying
posthospital care transitions in older patients. Journal of the American Medical
Directors Association, 5(2), 71-74. doi:10.1016/S1525-8610(04)70058-4
MacDermid, J. C., Fess, E. E., Bell-Krotoski, J., Cannon, N. M., Evans, R. B., Walsh,
W., Santore, G. (2002). A research agenda for hand therapy. Journal of Hand
Therapy, 15(1), 3-15. doi:10.1053/hanthe.2002.v15.0153
Mark, B. A., Harless, D. W., & McCue, M. (2005). The impact of HMO penetration on
the relationship between nurse staffing and quality. Health Economics, 14(7),
737-753. doi:10.1002/hec.988
Mark, B. A., Harless, D. W., McCue, M., & Xu, Y. (2004). A longitudinal examination of
hospital registered nurse staffing and quality of care. Health Services Research,
39(2), 279-300.
Marquis, M. S., Rogowski, J. A., & Escarce, J. J. (2004). The managed care backlash:
Did consumers vote with their feet? Inquiry, 41(4), 376-390.
Matchar, D. B., Harpole, L., Samsa, G. P., Jurgelski, A., Lipton, R. B., Silberstein, S.
D., Blumenfeld, A. (2008). The headache management trial: A randomized study

109

of coordinated care. Headache: The Journal of Head and Face Pain, 48(9),
1294-1310. doi:10.1111/j.1526-4610.2007.01148.x
Mays, G. P. (2004). MarketWatch: Managed care rebound? recent changes in health
plans' cost containment strategies. Health Affairs, doi:10.1377/hlthaff.w4.427
Mays, G. P., Hurley, R. E., & Grossman, J. M. (2003). An empty toolbox? changes in
health plans’ approaches for managing costs and care. Health Services
Research, 38(1), 375-393. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.00121
Mays, G., Au, M., & Claxton, G. (2007). MARKETWATCH: Convergence and
dissonance: Evolution in private- sector approaches to disease management and
care coordination. Health Affairs, 26(6), 1683-91.
McGuire, T. G., Newhouse, J. P., & Sinaiko, A. D. (2011). An economic history of
Medicare part C. The Milbank Quarterly, 89(2), 289-332.
Mechanic, D. (2001). The managed care backlash: Perceptions and rhetoric in health
care policy and the potential for health care reform. Milbank Quarterly, 79(1), 3554. doi:10.1111/1468-0009.00195
Mechanic, D., & Schlesinger, M. (1996). The impact of managed care on patients' trust
in medical care and their physicians. Jama, 275(21), 1693-1697.
Merrick, W., Elizabeth, Garnick, M., D., Horgan, M., C., & Hodgkin, M., D. (2002).
Quality measurement and accountability for substance abuse and mental health
services in managed care organizations. Medical Care, 40(12), 1238-1248.
Miller, N. H. (2006). Insurer- provider integration, credible commitment, and managedcare backlash. Journal of Health Economics, 25(5), 861-876.
doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.12.007

110

Miller, R. H., & Luft, H. S. (1994). Managed care plan performance since 1980: A
literature analysis. Jama, 271(19), 1512-1519.
Miller, R. H., & Luft, H. S. (1997). Does managed care lead to better or worse quality of
care? Health Affairs (Project Hope), 16(5), 7-25.
Miller, R. H., & Luft, H. S. (2002). HMO plan performance update: An analysis of the
literature, 1997-2001. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 21(4), 63-86.
Misra, R., Modawal, A., & Panigrahi, B. (2009). Asian-indian physicians' experience
with managed care organizations. International Journal of Health Care Quality
Assurance, 22(6), 582-599. doi:10.1108/09526860910986858
Mitchell, J. M., & Gaskin, D. J. (2004). Do children receiving supplemental security
income who are enrolled in Medicaid fare better under a fee-for- service or
comprehensive capitation model? Pediatrics, 114(1), 196.
Monahan, A. (2012). Fairness versus welfare in health insurance content regulation.
University of Illinois Law Review, , 12-02.
Morgan, S. R., Chang, A. M., Alqatari, M., & Pines, J. M. (2013). Non– emergency
department interventions to reduce ED utilization: A systematic review. Academic
Emergency Medicine, 20(10), 969-985. doi:10.1111/acem.12219
Mukamel, D. B., Weimer, D. L., Zwanziger, J., & Mushlin, A. I. (2002). Quality of
cardiac surgeons and managed care contracting practices. Health Services
Research, 37(5), 1129-1144. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.10212
Musser, J. (1997). State regulation of managed care: NAIC president Josephine
Musser. interview by John K. Iglehart. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 16(6), 36.

111

National Council of State Legislatures. (2011). Managed Care State Laws and
Regulations, Including Consumer and Provider Protections. Accessed April 6,
2015 at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/managed-care-statelaws.aspx.
Newacheck, P. W., Hung, Y. Y., Marchi, K. S., Hughes, D. C., Pitter, C., & Stoddard, J.
J. (2001). The impact of managed care on children's access, satisfaction, use,
and quality of care. Health Services Research, 36(2), 315.
Nicholas, L. H. (2013). Better quality of care or healthier patients? hospital utilization by
Medicare advantage and fee-for-service enrollees De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/fhep2012-0037
Noble, A. A., & Brennan, T. A. (1999). The stages of managed care regulation:
Developing better rules doi:10.1215/03616878-24-6-1275
Nutting, P. A., Dickinson, L. M., Rubenstein, L. V., Keeley, R. D., Smith, J. L., & Elliott,
C. E. (2005). Improving detection of suicidal ideation among depressed patients
in primary care. Annals of Family Medicine, 3(6), 529.
Paul, J., Jordan, R., Duty, S., & Engstrom, J. L. (2013). Improving satisfaction with care
and reducing length of stay in an obstetric triage unit using a nurse‐ midwife‐
managed model of care. Journal of Midwifery & Women's Health, 58(2), 175-181.
doi:10.1111/j.1542-2011.2012.00239.x
Peltzman, S., Levine, M. E., & Noll, R. G. (1989). The economic theory of regulation
after a decade of deregulation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Microeconomics, 1989, 1-59.

112

Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H. (2008). Systematic reviews in the social sciences: A
practical guide John Wiley & Sons.
Phillips, K. A., Mayer, M. L., & Aday, L. A. (2000). Barriers to care among racial/ethnic
groups under managed care. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 19(4), 65-75.
Pifer, T. B., Bragg-Gresham, J., Dykstra, D. M., Shapiro, J. R., Oppenheimer, C. C.,
Gaylin, D. S., Held, P. J. (2003). Quality of life and patient satisfaction: ESRD
managed care demonstration. Health Care Financing Review, 24(4), 45-58.
Pinkovskiy, M. L. (2014). The impact of the political response to the managed care
backlash on health care spending: Evidence from state regulations of managed
care Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Porell, F. W. (2001). A comparison of ambulatory care- sensitive hospital discharge
rates for Medicaid HMO enrollees and nonenrollees. Medical Care Research and
Review : MCRR, 58(4), 404.
Porell, F. W., & Miltiades, H. B. (2001). Disability outcomes of older Medicare HMO
enrollees and Fee‐for‐ service Medicare beneficiaries. Journal of the American
Geriatrics Society, 49(5), 615-631. doi:10.1046/j.1532-5415.2001.49123.x
Pracht, E. E., Orban, B. L., Comins, M. M., Large, J. T., & Asin-Oostburg, V. (2011).
The relative effectiveness of managed care penetration and the healthcare safety
net in reducing avoidable hospitalizations. Journal for Healthcare Quality : Official
Publication of the National Association for Healthcare Quality, 33(4), 42.
doi:10.1111/j.1945-1474.2011.00154.x

113

Price, R. A., Elliott, M. N., Cleary, P. D., Zaslavsky, A. M., & Hays, R. D. (2015). Should
health care providers be accountable for patients’ care experiences? Journal of
General Internal Medicine, 30(2), 253-256.
Ridgely, M., Giard, J., Shern, D., Mulkern, V., & Audrey Burnam, M. (2002). Managed
behavioral health care: An instrument to characterize critical elements of public
sector programs. Health Services Research, 37(4), 1105-1123.
doi:10.1034/j.1600-0560.2002.68.x
Rittenhouse, D. R., & Shortell, S. M. (2009). The patient-centered medical home: will it
stand the test of health reform?. Jama, 301(19), 2038-2040.
Robinson, J. C., & Ginsburg, P. B. (2009). Consumer-driven health care: Promise and
performance. Health Affairs, 28(2), w272-w281.
Rodwin, M. A. (1996). Consumer protection and managed care: The need for
organized consumers. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 15(3), 110-123.
Rodwin, V. (1997). The Rise of Managed Care in the United States: Lessons for
French Health Policy. Health Policy Reform, National Schemes and
Globalization. Ed. C. Altenstetter and J. Björkman. London: Macmillan; New
York: St. Martin's Press, l997.
Rogowski, J., Jain, A. K., & Escarce, J. J. (2007). Hospital competition, managed care,
and mortality after hospitalization for medical conditions in California. Health
Services Research, 42(2), 682-705. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00631.x
Roohan, P. J., Butch, J. M., Anarella, J. P., Gesten, F., & Shure, K. (2006). Quality
measurement in Medicaid managed care and fee-for- service: The New York

114

state experience. American Journal of Medical Quality : The Official Journal of
the American College of Medical Quality, 21(3), 185.
Safran, D. G., Montgomery, J. E., Chang, H., Murphy, J., & Rogers, W. H. (2001).
Switching doctors: Predictors of voluntary disenrollment from a primary
physician’s practice. J Fam Pract, 50(2), 130-136.
Safran, D. G., Wilson, I. B., Rogers, W. H., Montgomery, J. E., & Chang, H. (2002).
Primary care quality in the Medicare program: Comparing the performance of
Medicare health maintenance organizations and traditional fee-for-service
Medicare. Archives of Internal Medicine, 162(7), 757.
Schatz, M., Mosen, D., Apter, A. J., Zeiger, R. S., Vollmer, W. M., Stibolt, T. B., Cook,
E. F. (2005). Relationships among quality of life, severity, and control measures
in asthma: An evaluation using factor analysis. The Journal of Allergy and
Clinical Immunology, 115(5), 1049-1055. doi:10.1016/j.jaci.2005.02.008
Sekhri, N. (2000). Managed care: The US experience. World Health Organization.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78(6), 830-44.
Sequist, T. D., Schneider, E. C., Anastario, M., Odigie, E. G., Marshall, R., Rogers, W.
H., & Safran, D. G. (2008). Quality monitoring of physicians: Linking patients’
experiences of care to clinical quality and outcomes. Journal of General Internal
Medicine, 23(11), 1784-1790.
Shenkman, E., Tian, L., Nackashi, J., & Schatz, D. (2005). Managed care organization
characteristics and outpatient specialty care use among children with chronic
illness. Pediatrics, 115(6), 1547.

115

Shi, L., & Singh, D. A. (2014). Delivering health care in America Jones & Bartlett
Learning.
Shipman, P. (2012). Managed care: Right or wrong for North Carolina. North Carolina
Medical Journal, 73(3), 189.
Simon, C., White, W., Gamliel, S., & Kletke, P. (1997). The provision of primary care:
Does managed care make a difference? Health Affairs, 16(6), 89-98.
Skinner, A. C., & Mayer, M. L. (2007). Effects of insurance status on children's access
to specialty care: A systematic review of the literature. BMC Health Services
Research, 7, 194-194. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-7-194
Sloan, F. A., & Hall, M. A. (2002). Market failures and the evolution of state regulation
of managed care. Law and Contemporary Problems, 65(4), 169-206.
doi:10.2307/1192283
Sloan, F. A., Rattliff, J. R., & Hall, M. A. (2005). Impacts of managed care patient
protection laws on health services utilization and patient satisfaction with care.
Health Services Research, 40(3), 647-668. doi:10.1111/j.14756773.2005.00378.x
Slutsman, J., Emanuel, L. L., Fairclough, D., Bottorff, D., & Emanuel, E. J. (2002).
Managing End‐of‐ life care: Comparing the experiences of terminally ill patients in
managed care and fee for service. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society,
50(12), 2077-2083. doi:10.1046/j.1532-5415.2002.50622.x
Smith, A. P. (2003). Case management: Key to access, quality, and financial success.
Nursing Economic$, 21(5), 237-40, 244.

116

Smith, M. A., & Finch, M. D. (2005). Rehospitalization and survival for stroke patients in
managed care and traditional Medicare plans. Medical Care, 43(9), 902-910.
Spetz, J., & Baker, L. C. (1999). Has managed care affected the availability of medical
technology? Public Policy Institute of California.
Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science, , 3-21.
Street, R. L., Makoul, G., Arora, N. K., & Epstein, R. M. (2009). How does
communication heal? pathways linking clinician–patient communication to health
outcomes. Patient Education and Counseling, 74(3), 295-301.
Strunk, B. C., & Reschovsky, J. (2002). Kinder and gentler: Physicians and managed
care, 1997-2001 Center for Studying Health System Change.
Studdert, M., D., Bhattacharya, J., J., Schoenbaum, J., M., Warren, J., B., & Escarce,
J., J. (2002). Personal choices of health plans by managed care experts. Medical
Care, 40(5), 375-386.
Sun, B. C., Burstin, H. R., & Brennan, T. A. (2003). Predictors and outcomes of
frequent emergency department users. Academic Emergency Medicine, 10(4),
320-328. doi:10.1111/j.1553-2712.2003.tb01344.x
Swartz, K., & Brennan, T. A. (1996). Integrated health care, capitated payment, and
quality: The role of regulation. Annals of Internal Medicine, 124(4), 442.
Tai-Seale, M., & Pescosolido, B. (2003). The public's opinions of physicians: Do
perceived choice and exercised choice matter? The American Journal of
Managed Care, 9(9), 631-638. doi:2498 [pii]

117

Teixeira, R. (2000). Happy with health care? International Journal of Health Services :
Planning, Administration, Evaluation, 30(3), 581.
Thompson, J. W., Pinidiya, S. D., Ryan, K. W., McKinley, E. D., Alston, S., Bost, J. E. .
Simpson, P. (2003). Health plan quality-of- care information is undermined by
voluntary reporting. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 24(1), 62-70.
doi:10.1016/S0749-3797(02)00569-X
Thompson, J. W., Ryan, K. W., Pinidiya, S. D., & Bost, J. E. (2003). Quality of care for
children in commercial and Medicaid managed care. Jama, 290(11), 1486.
Thompson, M., & Cutler, C. (2010). Health care consumerism movement takes a step
forward. Benefits Quarterly, 26(1), 24-28.
Tietze, M., & Sinha, S. (2003). Impact of managed care on healthcare delivery
practices: The perception of healthcare administrators and clinical practitioners /
practitioner application. Journal of Healthcare Management, 48(5), 311-21;
discussion 321-2.
Titlow, K., & Emanuel, E. J. (1999). Employer decisions and the seeds of backlash.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 24(5), 941-947.
Unruh, L., & Wan, T. T. (2004). A systems framework for evaluating nursing care
quality in nursing homes. Journal of Medical Systems, 28(2), 197-214.
Van Voorhees, B.,W., Wang, N., & Ford, D. E. (2003). Managed care organizational
complexity and access to high- quality mental health services: Perspective of
U.S. primary care physicians. General Hospital Psychiatry, 25(3), 149-157.
doi:10.1016/S0163-8343(03)00017-3

118

White, K. R., Bazzoli, G. J., Roggenkamp, S. D., & Gu, T. (2005). Does case
management matter as a hospital cost-control strategy? Health Care
Management Review, 30(1), 32-43.
Wilensky, G. R. (1999). What's behind the public's backlash? Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law, 24(5), 1015-1019.
Willging, C., Waitzkin, H., & Wagner, W. (2005). Medicaid managed care for mental
health services in a rural state
Xu, X., & Jensen, G., A. (2007). Managed care and the near- elderly: Effects of plan
enrollment on functionality. Applied Economics, 39(16), 2027-2037.
doi:10.1080/00036840600707217
Zaslavsky, M., A., & Cleary, D., P. (2002). Dimensions of plan performance for sick and
healthy members on the consumer assessments of health plans study 2.0
survey. Medical Care, 40(10), 951-964.
Zelman, W. A. (1999). The view from the health plan trenches. Journal of Health
Politics, Policy and Law, 24(5), 1095-1098.
Zhan, C., Miller, M. R., Wong, H., & Meyer, G. S. (2004). The effects of HMO
penetration on preventable hospitalizations. Health Services Research, 39(2),
345-361. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2004.00231.x
Zolnierek, K. B., & Dimatteo, M. R. (2009). Physician communication and patient
adherence to treatment: A meta-analysis. Medical Care, 47(8), 826-834.
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e31819a5acc [doi]

119

Zuvekas, S. H., & Cohen, J. W. (2010). Paying physicians by capitation: Is the past
now prologue? Health Affairs (Project Hope), 29(9), 1661-1666.
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0361 [doi]
Zuvekas, S. H., & Hill, S. C. (2004). Does capitation matter? impacts on access, use,
and quality. Inquiry, , 316-335.
Zuvekas, S. H., & Olin, G. L. (2009). Validating household reports of health care use in
the medical expenditure panel survey. Health Services Research, 44(5p1), 16791700.

120

Appendix A

Appendix Table 1a. Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control
parameters: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (for Table 10a)
Appendix Table 1b. Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control
parameters: Satisfaction and Mortality (for Table 10a)
Appendix Table 1c. Marginal effects and standard errors for 2000-2004 control
parameters (for Table 10b)

121

Appendix Table 1a
Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control parameters: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (for
Table 10a)
Access to Care
Patient
Doctor has has no
night or
difficulty
weekend
contacting
hours
Doctor by
phone
Income ($000s),
1996 dollars

122

Race: Black

Race: Other
Education: No
high school
degree
Education:
College degree

-0.0003**

0.0004***

Patient
has no
difficulty
accessing
care
0.0006***

0.0005***

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

Patient is
confident
in Doctor

0.0002

-0.0001

0.0001

3.02E-05

(0.0001)

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

0.0106

0.0148

0.0047

-0.0006

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

-0.0359***

-0.0127

(0.0120)

(0.0121)

(0.0086)

(0.0072)

(0.0161)

(0.0108)

(0.0044)

(0.0050)

0.0067

-0.0102

-0.0136

-0.0110

-0.0757**

0.0116

0.0043

-0.0069

(0.0167)

(0.0183)

(0.0122)

(0.0097)

(0.0306)

(0.0152)

(0.0083)

(0.0082)

-0.0036

0.0048

0.0036

0.0074**

(0.0041)

(0.0031)

0.0784***

0.0387***

(0.0080)

(0.0068)

-0.0209**

-0.0216***

(0.0083)

(0.0080)

(0.0001)

Patient is
satisfied
with ability
to access
care

Confidence in Provider
Doctor
asks
Doctor
patient if
listens to
he/she is
patient
taking other
treatments

0.0282***

0.0018
(0.0061)

0.0113**
(0.0051)

0.0625***

0.0381***

-0.0323***

(0.0102)

(0.0060)

(0.0031)

(0.0034)

-0.0282**

0.0115

0.0017

0.0029

(0.0110)

(0.0070)

(0.0037)

(0.0040)

(Appendix Table 1a continued)
Access to Care

Confidence in Provider
Doctor
asks
patient if
Doctor
he/she is
listens to
taking
patient
other
treatments
-0.0070**
-0.0005
(0.0033)
(0.0016)
0.0664*** -0.0123***
(0.0095)
(0.0037)

Doctor
has night
or
weekend
hours

Patient
has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by
phone

Patient
has no
difficulty
accessing
care

Patient is
satisfied
with ability
to access
care

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

-0.0128***
(0.0041)
-0.0246*
(0.0126)

0.0068
(0.0046)
-0.0328***
(0.0125)

0.0012
(0.0031)
-0.0028
(0.0094)

0.0009
(0.0022)
-0.0159***
(0.0052)

0.0018
(0.0059)
-0.0536***
(0.0159)

Metropolitan
Statistical Area

0.156***

-0.0214

-0.0011

-0.0024

Married

(0.0169)
-0.0316***
(0.0068)

(0.0153)
0.0014
(0.0068)

(0.0075)
0.0124**
(0.0051)

(0.0054)
0.0107***
(0.0041)

(0.0183)
-0.0196*
(0.0105)

(0.0123)
0.0151***
(0.0052)

Chronic
condition

-0.0365***

-0.0005

-0.0236***

-0.0103***

-0.0218**

(0.0068)

(0.0074)

(0.0044)

(0.0034)

-0.0420***

-0.0021

-0.0085

(0.0162)

(0.0139)

-0.0343**

Female
Hispanic
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Whole county
PCP shortage
Partial county
PCP shortage
Self-reported
poor health

0.0100

0.0050

Patient is
confident
in Doctor

0.0004
(0.0021)
-0.0030
(0.0045)

0.0001

-0.0038

(0.0047)
-0.0032
(0.0031)

(0.0055)
-0.0025
(0.0031)

-0.0087

0.0004

-0.0018

(0.0088)

(0.0055)

(0.0034)

(0.0039)

-0.0034

0.0032

-0.0241**

-0.0072

-0.0122**

(0.0084)

(0.0076)

(0.0173)

(0.0105)

(0.0050)

(0.0057)

0.0255*

-0.0045

-0.0017

0.0055

-0.0170

-0.0050

-0.0098*

(0.0161)

(0.0148)

(0.0092)

(0.0079)

(0.0184)

(0.0109)

(0.0049)

-0.0107

-0.0148

-0.0417***

-0.0373***

-0.0049

0.0146*

(0.0100)

(0.0101)

(0.0061)

(0.0052)

(0.0127)

(0.0080)

(0.0056)
-0.0148***
0.0118***
(0.0039)
(0.0043)

(Appendix Table 1a continued)
Access to Care

Medicare:
Aged
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Medicare:
Disability

Medicaid

Confidence in Provider

Doctor has
night or
weekend
hours

Patient
has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by
phone

Patient
has no
difficulty
accessing
care

Patient is
satisfied
with ability
to access
care

-0.145***

0.0048

0.0963***

0.0390***

(0.0108)

(0.0101)

(0.0092)

(0.0070)

(0.0131)

(0.0073)

(0.0039)

(0.0054)

-0.0224

0.0351

-0.0043

-0.0022

0.0091

0.0036

-0.0026

-0.0026

(0.0203)

(0.0216)

(0.0121)

(0.0083)

(0.0272)

(0.0154)

(0.0076)

(0.0091)

-0.0693***

-0.0208*

-0.0660***

-0.0398***

-0.0331**

-0.0084

-0.0122***

-0.0138***

(0.0119)

(0.0109)

(0.0069)

(0.0050)

(0.0156)

(0.0091)

(0.0039)

(0.0051)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

0.0310**

Doctor asks
patient if
he/she is
taking other
treatments

Doctor
listens to
patient

-0.0341***

0.0015

Patient is
confident
in Doctor

0.0178***

Appendix Table 1b
Marginal effects and standard errors for 1996-2000 control parameters: Satisfaction and Mortality (for Table 10a)

Income ($000s), 1996 dollars
Race: Black
Race: Other
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Education: No high school degree
Education: College degree

Satisfaction

Mortality

Patient is satisfied with care

Patient did not die during the
survey year, or year after

-1.80E-05
(0.0001)

(0.0000)

0.0108*

-0.0006

(0.0061)

(0.0009)

-0.0054

(0.0022)

0.0013

0.0007

(0.0036)

(0.0008)

0.00793*

-0.0021
(0.0024)

Hispanic

Metropolitan Statistical Area

0.0048**

(0.0111)

(0.0043)
Female

6.74e-05**

0.0002

0.0008
(0.0011)
0.0041***
(0.0007)
0.0028**

(0.0050)

(0.0013)

-0.0106**

0.0006

(0.0052)

(0.0007)

(Appendix Table 1b continued)

Married
Chronic condition
Whole county PCP shortage
Partial county PCP shortage
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Self-reported poor health

Medicare: Aged

Medicare: Disability
Medicaid

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Satisfaction

Mortality

Patient is satisfied with care

Patient did not die during the
survey year, or year after

-0.0028
(0.0037)
-0.0067*
(0.0038)
-0.0030
(0.0065)
0.0032
(0.0063)
-0.0177***

0.0012*
(0.0007)
-0.0044***
(0.0012)
-0.0003
(0.0010)
-0.0009
(0.0011)
-0.0087***

(0.0046)

(0.0009)

0.0328***

-0.0146***

(0.0061)

(0.0012)

0.0112
(0.0098)
-0.0116**
(0.0054)

-0.0046**
(0.0020)
-2.22E-05
(0.0011)

Appendix Table 1c
Marginal effects and standard errors for 2000-2004 control parameters (for Table 10b)
Confidence in
Provider

Access to Care

Doctor has night
or weekend
hours
Income ($000s), 1996
dollars
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Race: Black

Race: Other

Education: No high school
degree
Education: College degree
Female

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by phone

Doctor asks
patient if he/she is
taking other
treatments

-0.0002

0.0002

-0.0001

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

-0.0360***

-0.0128

(0.0120)

(0.0120)

(0.0108)

0.0087

-0.0131

0.0110

(0.0169)

(0.0182)

(0.0153)

0.0780***
(0.0080)
-0.0219***
(0.0083)
-0.0128***
(0.0042)

0.0390***
(0.0067)
-0.0195**
(0.0079)
0.0062
(0.0045)

0.0380***

Mortality
Patient did not
die during the
survey year, or
year after
6.57e-05**
(0.0000)
-0.0006
(0.0009)
0.0047**
(0.0022)

-0.0323***

0.0007

(0.0060)
0.0107
(0.0070)
-0.0069**
(0.0033)

(0.0008)
0.0007
(0.0008)
0.0007
(0.0011)

(Appendix Table 1c continued)
Confidence in
Provider

Access to Care

Hispanic

Metropolitan Statistical Area

Doctor has night
or weekend
hours

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by phone

-0.0247*

-0.0281**

(0.0126)

(0.0125)

(0.0094)

-0.0104

0.0009

(0.0150)

(0.0125)

0.155***
(0.0171)
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Married
Chronic condition
Whole county PCP shortage
Partial county PCP shortage
Self-reported poor health

-0.0319***

0.0022

Doctor asks
patient if he/she is
taking other
treatments
0.0646***

0.0149***

Mortality
Patient did not
die during the
survey year, or
year after
0.0041***
(0.0007)
0.0028**
(0.0013)
0.0006

(0.0069)

(0.0068)

(0.0052)

(0.0007)

-0.0358***

-0.0053

-0.0083

0.0012*

(0.0068)

(0.0074)

(0.0055)

(0.0007)

-0.0414**

-0.0004

-0.0249**

-0.0003

(0.0161)

(0.0137)

(0.0104)

(0.0010)

-0.0345**

0.0243*

-0.0161

-0.0008

(0.0160)

(0.0146)

(0.0108)

(0.0011)

-0.0115

-0.0125

0.0144*

(0.0101)

(0.0100)

(0.0080)

-0.0087***
(0.0009)

(Appendix Table 1c continued)
Confidence in
Provider

Access to Care
Doctor has night
or weekend
hours
Medicare: Aged
Medicare: Disability
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Medicaid

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by phone

-0.146***

0.0083

(0.0108)

Doctor asks
patient if he/she
is taking other
treatments

Mortality
Patient did not die
during the survey
year, or year after

-0.0355***

-0.0145***

(0.0101)

(0.0072)

(0.0012)

-0.0236

0.0370*

0.0031

-0.0045**

(0.0204)

(0.0216)

(0.0153)

(0.0020)

-0.0687***

-0.0224**

-0.0089

0.0000

(0.0119)

(0.0109)

(0.0092)

(0.0011)

Appendix B

Appendix Table 2a. Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Access to Care and
Confidence in Provider (no control variables)
Appendix Table 2b. Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Satisfaction with Care
and Mortality (no control variables)
Appendix Table 2c. Marginal effects for 2000-2004 base model (no control variables)
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Appendix Table 2a
Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Access to Care and Confidence in Provider (no control variables)
Access to Care

y2000
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Managed
Care
(MC)
Moderate
(Mod)

Doctor
has night
or
weekend
hours

Patient
has no
difficulty
contacting
Doctor by
phone

-0.0072

-0.0828***

(0.0168)

MC *
y2000

Patient
has no
difficulty
accessing
care

Patient is
satisfied
with ability
to access
care

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

0.0055

0.0028

0.0021

(0.0148)

(0.0142)

(0.0089)

(0.0244)

0.101***

-0.0282**

-0.0006

(0.0128)

(0.0132)

(0.0073)

0.0277*
(0.0165)

High

Confidence in Provider

-0.0806***

0.0953***
(0.0167)
0.0757***

Doctor asks
patient if
he/she is
taking other
treatments

Patient is
confident in
Doctor

0.0082

-0.0050

(0.0149)

(0.0069)

(0.0074)

-0.0096

-0.0188*

0.0012

(0.0063)

(0.0145)

(0.0109)

(0.0045)

(0.0051)

-0.0180

-0.0169

0.0324

-0.0001

-0.0004

0.0079

(0.0168)

(0.0116)

(0.0315)

(0.0139)

(0.0075)

(0.0087)

-0.0334*

-0.0274***

0.0167

0.0066

-0.0034

0.0033

0.0168***

0.0519***

Doctor
listens to
patient

-0.0157***

(0.0159)

(0.0156)

(0.0173)

(0.0102)

(0.0271)

(0.0118)

(0.0081)

(0.0087)

-0.0080

0.0011

0.0318*

0.0191

0.0297

-0.0278*

0.0058

0.0114

(0.0180)

(0.0178)

(0.0176)

(0.0123)

(0.0309)

(0.0166)

(0.0094)

(0.0099)

(Appendix Table 2a continued)
Access to Care
Patient
Doctor
has no
has night
difficulty
or
contacting
weekend
PCP by
hours
phone
MC *
Moderate
MC *
High

Confidence in Provider
Patient
has no
difficulty
accessing
care

Patient is
satisfied
with
ability to
access
care

Patient has
no difficulty
getting an
appointment

Doctor asks
patient if
he/she is
taking other
treatments

Doctor
listens to
patient

Patient is
confident in
Doctor
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0.0114

0.0207

0.0295

0.0256*

-0.0522

0.0239

-0.0075

-0.0005

(0.0211)

(0.0205)

(0.0213)

(0.0152)

(0.0330)

(0.0177)

(0.0105)

(0.0125)

0.0237

-0.0031

0.0063

-0.0055

-0.0645*

0.0156

-0.0097

0.0008

(0.0194)

(0.0200)

(0.0214)

(0.0148)

(0.0352)

(0.0170)

(0.0108)

(0.0125)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Appendix Table 2b
Marginal effects for 1996-2000 base model: Satisfaction with Care and Mortality (no control variables)
Satisfaction

Mortality

Patient is satisfied with
care

Patient did not die during
the survey year, or year
after

y2000

-0.0042
(0.0083)

y2000

Managed Care (MC)

-0.0171**

MC

(0.0071)
Moderate (Mod)
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High
MC * y2000

-0.0194**
(0.0088)
-0.0077
(0.0099)
0.0293**
(0.0132)

MC * Moderate

-0.0071

MC * High

(0.0136)
-0.0156
(0.0153)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

-0.0012
(0.0014)
0.0179***
(0.0025)

ModHigh

0.0001
(0.0013)

MC * y2000

0.0063*
(0.0037)

MC * ModHigh

-0.0012
(0.0014)

Appendix Table 2c
Marginal effects for 2000-2004 base model (no control variables)
Confidence in
Provider

Access to Care

Doctor has
night or
weekend hours
y2004
MC
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Moderate
High
MC * y2004
MC * Moderate
MC * High
Mod * y2004
High * y2004

-0.0631**
(0.0282)
0.101***
(0.0131)
0.0383
(0.0252)
-0.0868***
(0.0214)
-0.0840**
(0.0380)
-0.0082
(0.0273)
0.0089
(0.0257)
0.0267
(0.0408)
0.0594
(0.0374)

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting PCP
by phone
0.137***
(0.0298)
-0.0220*
(0.0131)
0.0328
(0.0238)
-0.0278
(0.0211)
0.0464
(0.0313)
0.0012
(0.0270)
0.0126
(0.0248)
-0.0297
(0.0395)
0.0255
(0.0365)

Mortality

Doctor asks
patient if he/she
is taking other
treatments
-0.0163
(0.0245)
-0.0254**
(0.0114)
0.0513***
(0.0199)
0.0709***
(0.0182)
0.0085
(0.0310)
-0.0266
(0.0211)
-0.0151
(0.0265)
-0.0542*
(0.0324)
-0.0689**
(0.0311)

y2004
MC
ModHigh

MC * y2004
MC * ModHigh

ModHigh * y2004

Patient did
not die
during the
survey
year, or
year after
0.0006
(0.0025)
0.0189***
(0.0027)
-0.0023
(0.0018)

-0.0060
(0.0060)
0.0094**
(0.0047)

0.0033
(0.0030)

(Appendix Table 2c continued)

0.107**

-0.0095

Confidence in
Provider
Doctor asks
patient if
he/she is
taking other
treatments
0.0782**

(0.0500)

(0.0420)

(0.0379)

0.103**
(0.0478)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

-0.0653
(0.0414)

0.0265
(0.0424)

Access to Care
Doctor has
night or
weekend
hours
MC * Mod * y2004
MC * High * y2004

Patient has no
difficulty
contacting
PCP by phone

Mortality
Patient did not
die during the
survey year,
or year after
MC*ModHigh * y2004

0.0003
(0.0080)
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